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JURISDICTION 
Appellee and defendant below Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit 
Water") agrees with Appellant Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC ("Bear Hollow") that 
jurisdiction is properly vested in this Court pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-
102(3)(e)(i) (2009) and the Court's May 26, 2010 Order electing to retain jurisdiction. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Although Bear Hollow has identified four issues for the Court to consider on 
appeal, it is as important to note what is omitted from the scope of reviewr as what is 
included. Pursuant to rule, this Court's review should be limited to those issues 
specifically set forth by Bear Hollow in its appeal. Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) (2010). 
Further, the issues on review cannot be considered if they were not raised in Bear 
Hollow's Request for Rehearing before the Public Service Commission ("PSC"). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b) (2009) ("An applicant may not urge or rely on any 
ground not set forth in the application [for rehearing] in an appeal to any court."). 
Moreover, the Court should uphold the PSC's ruling of dismissal as a matter of law on 
any ground made available to the Commission in the proceedings below, including 
rationales included in the Order that are not addressed by Bear Hollow's appeal. Doe v. 
Maret, 1999 UT 74, ^ 5, 984 P.2d 980. 
Bear Hollow's Issue #1: Bear Hollow frames the first issue on appeal as whether 
the PSC erred in granting Summit Water's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
where there were allegations that (a) Summit Water provided water service to non-
shareholders "through the sale of shares," and (b) Summit Water is not a bona fide non-
6 
profit company because it is controlled by certain individual shareholders (hereafter, the 
"Individual Shareholders")-1 (See Brief of Appellant Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC 
("App. Brief) at 1). However, contrary to Bear Hollow'$ broadly defined appeal, its 
Request for Rehearing only raised the argument that sales pf property with appurtenant 
shares required Summit Water to provide water service to th$ general public. (R. 024 at 8 
(attached hereto as Exhibit A)). Accordingly, Bear Hollow's appeal of the PSC's 
decision that Summit Water did not serve the public should be limited to the argument 
made in the Request for Rehearing regarding property sal^s reducing Summit Water's 
control over membership, not the arguments about renters, public facilities, or sales of 
Class A shares by individual shareholders that are raised in the body of Bear Hollow's 
appeal arguments. (App. Brief at 26, 28-31). 
Additionally, the only issue appealed by Bear Hollow regarding Summit Water's 
non-profit status is that the PSC should have examined whether the company is 
"dominated and controlled by the Saunders/Knowles Respondents." (App. Brief at 2). 
There is no allegation before this Court (nor in the record) that Summit Water itself has 
profited from its operations or in any way forfeited its good standing with the State of 
Utah as a non-profit entity. 
Standard of Review: Summit Water does not dispute the standard of review Bear 
Hollow cites for consideration of an agency's legal conclusions. However, Bear 
The Individual Shareholders in question were also nanjied as respondents by Bear 
Hollow in the proceedings before the PSC, and are parties to the appeal as well. The 
Individual Shareholders join in this brief, and will file their own appeal brief 
concurrently. 
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Hollow's claim that this Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true 
should be tempered with the well-accepted principle (recognized by the PSC) that "the 
sufficiency of the facts 'must be determined by the facts pleaded rather than the 
conclusions stated."' (R. 023 at 2 (attached hereto as Exhibit B) (quoting Franco v. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, |^ 26)). Certain allegations 
couched as factual claims are merely legal conclusions, which neither the PSC nor this 
Court should accept as true for purposes of evaluating jurisdiction. See, e.g. R. 023 at 6, 
citing Franco, 2001 UT 25 at 1f 26, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009); 
Jackson v. Alexander, 465 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1972). 
Bear Hollow's Issue #2: This issue refers specifically to the Individual 
Shareholders and is addressed by their opposition brief. 
Bear Hollow's Issue #3: Bear Hollow7 appeals whether it was substantially 
prejudiced by a dismissal that allegedly contradicts the PSC's prior practices and claims 
such dismissal constitutes de facto rule-making. Bear Hollow's statement of this issue 
omits the critical facts that: (1) the PSC's decision will have no substantive effect on the 
scope of its jurisdiction; and (2) the decision was expressly designed to procedurally 
align the Commission's analysis with Supreme Court precedent and the statutory limits 
on PSC authority. 
Standard of Review. Summit Water does not dispute that questions of law, 
including jurisdiction, are reviewed under a correction of error standard. However, with 
respect to whether or not the PSC was required to engage in formal rulemaking in order 
to dismiss Bear Hollow's Complaint, the Court grants administrative agencies 
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considerable deference in "commission interpretations of thq operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer" (Williams v Mountain States Tel. and Tel. 
Co., 763 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1988)) and will overturn those decisions only if they 
exceed the "tolerable limits of reason" or are otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 
800 (J. Durham dissenting) (citing Utah Dept. of Admin. Sei^vs. v. Public Serv. Comm V?, 
658 P.2d 601, 609-612 (Utah 1983)). 
Bear Hollow Issue #4: Summit Water agrees with! the statement of the issue 
presented for the Court's review, namely whether the Commission erred when it 
determined Bear Hollow could not amend its Complaint as £ matter of right pursuant to 
Utah Administrative Rule 746-100-3.C after the Commission had entered an order 
dismissing the entire case for lack of jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review. Bear Hollow misstated the standard of review in its brief by 
referring to it as a ''general question[] of law" that the court should review under the 
ucorrection-of-error standard." (See App. Brief at 3). This issue involves the 
Commission's interpretation and application of its own procedural rules. As such, this 
Court "should employ an intermediate standard, one of sonjie, but not total, deference." 
Resort Retainers v. Labor Comm'n., 2010 UT App 229, ^ 3 , P.3d (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) (reviewing agency's application of its rules). In 
other words, the Court should "review the Commission's application of its own rules for 
reasonableness and rationality." Id.; see also Union Pacific R. Co. v Auditing Div. of 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1992) ("Because courts should uphold 
agency rules if they are reasonable and rational, courts shoul|d also uphold reasonable and 
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rational departures from those rules . . . . We thus employ an intermediate standard (one 
of some, but not total, deference) in reviewing Union Pacific's claim that the 
Commission erred in applying its rules."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
A) Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2010): uThe commission is hereby vested with 
power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state and to 
supervise all of the business of every such public utility . . . ."" 
B) Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) (2010): '"Public utility' includes every . . . 
water corporation . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, 
the public generally . . . . " ' 
C) Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29) (2010): fc"Water corporation' includes every 
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, 
operating, or managing any water system for public service within this state." 
D) Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (2009): "(1) Before seeking judicial review of the 
commission's action, any party . . . who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission 
shall meet the requirements of this section. (2)(a) After an order or decision has been 
made by the commission, any party to the action . . . may apply for rehearing of any 
matters determined in the action or proceeding, (b) An applicant may not urge or rely on 
any ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any court. . . ." 
2
 Full text attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
J
 Full text attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
4
 Full text attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
~ Full text attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
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E) Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-20U4) (2009): Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) agency action applies only to internal agency management, . . . ; (c) an agency issues 
policy or other statements that are advisory, informative and descriptive, and do not 
conform to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3); or (d) an agency makes 
nonsubstantive changes in a rule, except that the agency shall file all nonsubstantive 
changes in a rule with the division."6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Formed in 1979, Summit Water is a non-profit mutual water company that 
provides water to its shareholders in unincorporated areas of (Summit County. (R. 01 at 1^ 
20). The shareholders are represented by a duly elected Bo^rd of Directors that sets the 
rates, connection charges and assessments paid by all shareholders receiving water. (R. 
01, Ex. U at Articles VL IX). In Summit Water's three decades of operation, there has 
never been a shareholder complaint filed with the PSC regarding rates or inadequate 
sendee.7 (R. 06 at n.4). 
Pursuant to its charter, Summit Water operates as a cooperative association and 
limits service to its shareholders. (R. 01, Ex. U at Article II). Summit Water only 
distributes water under shares of corporate stock and only imposes assessments based on 
share ownership and shareholder interest. There are no charges for water supply levied 
against any individuals, corporations or other entities that ar£ not already shareholders in 
Summit Water. (R. 025 at 5; R. 023 at 13-14). 
6
 Full text attached hereto as Exhibit F. 
7
 Notably, even Bear Hollow does not claim that Summit Water's rates are too high or 
that there is inadequate quantity or quality of water. 
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In order to receive water service from Summit Water, a consumer must not only 
be a shareholder, but also must satisfy multiple requirements of the company. (R. 018 at 
5; R. 023 at n.4). It is uncontested that Summit Water retains the ability to reject anyone 
that is not willing to meet the requirements imposed on shareholders, even if they have 
purchased a share from an existing shareholder. (R. 023 at 13). 
None of Summit Water's directors has ever received any compensation from 
Summit Water for their services over the past thirty-plus years. (R. 06 at 3). It is 
undisputed that Summit Water is a registered non-profit in good standing with the State 
of Utah. (R. 01 at If 2). 
The PSC's dismissal of Bear Hollow's Complaint reaffirmed the Commission's 
repeated exemption of Summit Water from regulation. Since initially granting Summit 
Water a letter of exemption in 1989, the PSC has considered (and declined) three other 
requests that the exemption be reexamined. (R. 06 at 1-2). In response to each of those 
inquiries (in 1994, 2002, and 2003), the PSC concluded that there was nothing that would 
justify a change in Summit Water's exemption. (Id). Each time that the PSC requested 
information, Summit Water provided the Division of Public Utilities and the PSC with all 
relevant information, including its corporate documents, shareholder information, and 
voting structure. (Id. at 2). In fact, representatives from the Division of Public Utilities 
have also attended Summit Water shareholder meetings and carefully observed those 
proceedings. (R. 01, Ex. R at 2). Again, the PSC never found any evidence that 
indicated a need to regulate Summit Water, nor were there any allegations of problems 
with water quality, quantity, or unfair charges being assessed to shareholders. 
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Bear Hollow's Complaint arises in a contractual disbute wherein Summit Water 
declined to amend a development agreement to remove ah appurtenancy requirement 
from Bear Hollow's Class A shares. In March 2009, B^ar Hollow entered into an 
agreement to sell shares of Summit Water Distribution Company stock to Park City. (R. 
01 at Tj 114). Bear Hollow entered into the agreement with it5ark City despite being fully 
aware that the shares were not available to be transferred for use away from the property 
because they are appurtenant to the Bear Hollow development under the express terms of 
the 1998 Development Agreement with Summit Water ahd Article V, f^ 1(a) of the 
Summit Water Bylaws. (Id at *|j 111; R. 06 at 6). Unable to complete its sale without the 
transfer of the water shares away from the development property, Bear Hollow requested 
that Summit Water amend the Development Agreement ahd remove the appurtenancy 
requirement. Summit Water declined that request because tt would contradict both the 
company's bylaws and the well-established policy justifications for maintaining a link 
between the water shares and the property in order to protect the interests of all 
shareholders.8 (R. 06 at 7; R. 01 at fflf 115-116). Following that denial, Bear Hollow 
brought the underlying action asking the PSC to regulate ipt only Summit Water, but 
also certain individual shareholders. (R. 01 at^ flf 134-140). 
Summit Water and the Individual Shareholders moved to dismiss the Bear Hollow 
Complaint, and the PSC granted those motions. (R. 023, attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
With respect to Summit Water's Motion to Dismiss, the PSCfs correctly concluded that it 
These policy justifications include: engineering considerations; protection of the 
homeowners; water rights considerations; environmental commitments: changing water 
use patterns; Division of Drinking Water minimum standards; and market stability. 
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lacked jurisdiction because Summit Water is not a '^public utility" that serves the general 
public. {Id.). The PSC evaluated, and rejected as inadequate. Bear Hollow's arguments 
that Summit Water served the general public by providing water to public facilities (id. at 
13), or through the potential sale of shares. (Id.). Considering all the factual allegations 
in the Complaint to be true, the PSC concluded that, "Absent any allegation that would 
factually allege that Summit serves those who are not shareholders, the Commission 
cannot assert jurisdiction - even for an investigation, and must dismiss." (Id. at 12). The 
PSC also held that it was not appropriate for it to evaluate whether Summit Water had 
violated any laws governing non-profit corporations, beyond noting that the company is 
organized and registered in good standing with the State of Utah as a non-profit 
organization. (Id. at 15). 
Following the PSC's dismissal of its Complaint, Bear Hollow filed a motion 
asking the PSC to reconsider its decision and simultaneously filed an Amended 
Complaint. (R. 024). On March 29, 2010, the PSC denied the request for rehearing and 
declined to consider the Amended Complaint as it had already dismissed the action. (R. 
027). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bear Hollow's appeal attempts to defend a complaint where, even assuming the 
facts alleged were true, the claims fail for lack of jurisdiction. To avoid this outcome, 
Bear Hollow would have the Court assume that the legal conclusions stated in the 
Complaint are true, and grant it the "favorable inference" from those assertions that 
jurisdiction may exist. Tellingh, Bear Hollow cannot cite to any legal authority that 
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extends the deference ordinarily due factual allegations on a motion to dismiss to mere 
legal averments. Bear Hollow's bald assertions that Summit I Water is a "public utility" or 
a "water corporation" subject to the PSC's jurisdiction fail |to meet the long-established 
factual prerequisites for the PSC to assert its authority under the Garkane line of cases or 
the applicable statutes. Absent allegations that establish Summit Water serves the public 
and therefore may be a public utility, there is no basis for regulation by the PSC and the 
dismissal of Bear Hollow's Complaint should be upheld. 
Additionally, the PSC's dismissal did not require tormal rulemaking as the 
decision was fully in-line with (and compelled by) lohg-standing Supreme Court 
precedent, statutory authorization, and the Commission's own policies. The PSC's 
subsequent repeal of its own administrative rule emphasized that the rationale and 
approach of its jurisdictional analysis was not a substahtive change, but merely a 
clarification that the statutory requirement of serving the public was the controlling initial 
inquiry preceding the possibility of PSC regulation. There is no reason for the Court to 
question the PSC's own conclusion that this approach will not change the end result of 
which entities were regulated and which were exempt, removing the necessity for formal 
rulemaking procedures before properly dismissing Bear Hollpw's Complaint. 
In order to minimize redundancy between their opposition briefs, the Individual 
Shareholders and Summit Water have agreed that this brief will only address Bear 
Hollow's arguments regarding the PSC's lack of jurisdiction over the company, as well 
as the alleged "de facto rulemaking." With respect to the arguments directed at the 
Indi\idual Shareholders and the procedural question of the Amended Complaint, Summit 
15 
Water joins in the arguments presented in the Individual Shareholders' brief, and will not 
repeat those arguments here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The PSC Correctly Dismissed Bear Hollow's Complaint For Lack of 
Jurisdiction. 
As the PSC duly recognized, serving the public is a necessary prerequisite to its 
jurisdiction or authority: 
LTf the business or concern is not public service, where the public has not a 
legal right to the use of it, where the business or operation is not open to an 
indefinite public, it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the 
commission...." Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 
P.2d 571 572 (Utah 1940). "It is only by the presence of such a factor or 
element that the commission has power or authority to regulate or control 
such business. Eliminating it, its power and jurisdiction are gone." State ex 
rel Public Utilities Comm 'n v. Nelson, 238 P. 237 (Utah 1925). 
(R. 023 at 11). Garkane and subsequent cases addressing the PSC's jurisdiction affirm 
that, "'the test... is... whether the public has a legal right to the use which cannot be 
gainsaid, or denied, or withdrawn, at the pleasure of the owner.'" Garkane, 100 P.2d at 
573 (omissions in original) (quoting Farmers' Market Co. v. R.R. Co., 142 Pa. 580, 21 A. 
902,989, 990 (1891)).9 
9
 There have been at least six cases before the Utah Supreme Court where the Court 
found the PSC had no jurisdiction based on the distinction between private and public 
service. See State of Utah ex. rel. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 
P.237 (1925); Garkane Power Co. Inc. v. Public Serv. Commyn, 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 
571 (1940); San Miguel Power Ass'n. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 252, 292 P.2d 
511 (1956); Medic-Call, Inc., et al v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 24 Utah 2d, 273, 
470 P.2d 258 (1970); Cottonwood Mall Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of 
Utah, et al., 558 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1977); Holmgren et al. v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 
P.2d 856 (1978). 
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In short, the analytical framework set forth in Garkane and Nelson requires that an 
entity provide service to the public in order to fall within the PSC's statutory authority 
under Utah Code section 54-4-1. The Utah Supreme Court has held that, LCIt is only by 
the presence of such factor or element [serving the public] that the commission has power 
or authority to regulate or control such business. Eliminating it, its power and 
jurisdiction are gone." State of Utah ex. rel. Public Serv. Comm 'n v. Nelson, 65 Utah 
457, 238 P. 237, 239 (1925) (emphasis added) (wC[I]f the business or concern is not public 
service . . . it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the commission."). Cf San 
Miguel Power Assn. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 292 P.2d 5l|l. 512 (Utah 1956) ("Since 
plaintiffs cannot legally be required to serve the public generally, they are not public 
utilities and the Commission correctly so decided."). Thus, factual allegations that 
Summit Water serves the public are properly treated as a condition precedent (though not 
the only one) to the PSC's jurisdiction. 
Bear Hollow does not allege or establish that Summit Water is "legally . . . 
required to serve the public generally," id., or that Summit Water's ^'business or concern 
is . . . public service," Nelson, 238 P. at 239. Instead, B$ar Hollow contends that the 
PSC misapplied Garkane when it focused on a single factor - whether Summit Water 
delivered water to the public - as determinative of jurisdiction. However, since Bear 
Hollow does not argue that serving the public is a non-ff&c\ov. it is hard to see how this 
position can undermine the PSC's reasoning. In other wordi Bear Hollow may very well 
be right - if the Commission determines that an entity is (serving the public generally, 
there may be other considerations that the Commission shoiild then consider, such as the 
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ones raised by Bear Hollow and referenced in Garkane. However, none of these 
additional considerations is sufficient to establish jurisdiction where the initial step of 
serving the public is not present. See Nelson, 238 P. at 239 (unless the entity serves the 
public, the commission lacks any power or jurisdiction; Garkane, 100 P.2d at 572 (if 
there is no public service, there is no PSC jurisdiction); Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(16)(a) 
(2010) (defining those utilities potentially subject to PSC regulation as those "where the 
service is performed for, or the commodity is delivered to, the public generally . . . ."). 
In fact, it is noteworthy that Bear Hollow does not (and cannot) dispute the 
importance of serving the public as a threshold requirement for PSC jurisdiction, but 
merely complains that there should be additional requirements as well, such as the factors 
included in the (now repealed) PSC Rule 746-331-1, titled "Conditions for Finding 
Exemption." {See App. Brief at 24-25). However, the very rule that Bear Hollow insists 
"codified" the Garkane analysis omits any reference to whether or not the entity in 
question qualifies as a "public utility" by serving the general public. This omission 
demonstrates the flaw in referring solely to Rule 746-331-1 (even while it was in effect) 
as a measure of the PSC's authorized jurisdiction. Accordingly, the PSC properly 
followed the line of cases emphasizing the necessity of determining whether an entity is a 
"public utility" before any possible assertion of PSC authority. 
A. Bear Hollow's Complaint Failed To Include Any Factual Allegations 
That Summit Water Serves Non-Shareholders or the General Public. 
Bear Hollows' arguments regarding jurisdiction improperly attempt to expand the 
scope of this Court's review by introducing allegations that were not present in its 
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Complaint. In fact, Bear Hollow used a similar tactic in the ijnderlying proceedings when 
it raised these allegations in opposition to the motions seeking dismissal. However, the 
PSC correctly recognized that "factual allegations outside of the pleadings arguing for 
Commission jurisdiction" were not properly before the PSC and "cannot be properly 
considered as part of the Complaint's allegations." (R. 0231 at 12, n.4). The allegations 
found to be outside of the pleadings included the claims that| (a) Summit Water provided 
water to the public by serving public facilities and renters; (|b) Summit Water lacked the 
ability to control membership in the company; and (c) Surrunit Water marketed services 
to the general public and in some areas where it is the only water service provider. (R. 
023 at 12-14). Although the PSC noted that these arguments fail even if they are 
assumed to be true, it also did not find them present in the Complaint or properly before 
the Commission. Similarly, on appeal the Court should on|y consider the allegations in 
Bear Hollow's Complaint, not factual claims raised for |the first time in responsive 
briefing.10 (See, e.g R. 028 at 20 (Bear Hollow: "Today ah we need to think about and 
all we need to look at today is the complaint and the allegations made there. Now, that's 
been recognized 1 think by everybody; there's no question about that."). 
When limited to the allegations present in the Complaint, it becomes clear that 
Bear Hollow relied on conclusory assertions rather than the factual allegations necessary 
to establish jurisdiction. Although Bear Hollow alleged that Summit Water was a "public 
10
 For the sake of completeness, Summit Water will addrtss Bear Hollow's additional 
factual assertions infra. However, Summit Water agrees with the PSC that such 
assertions are beyond the scope of the Complaint that was |the subject of the motions to 
dismiss. 
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utility" and a "water corporation" subject to the PSC's jurisdiction (see R. 01 at ^ j 16, 
18), these legal catchphrases cannot be assumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 
As the PSC found: 
A review of the Complaint shows that although Bear Hollow makes several 
conclusory legal allegations, alleging Summit is serving the public, there is 
no factual allegation that Summit provides services directly to anyone other 
than shareholders. 
(R. 023 at 11). The sufficiency of a complaint "must be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints 2001 UT 25, ^ 26, 21 P.3d 198 (quoting Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 
(Utah 1974)). "[M]ere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation 
of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude" dismissal or summary 
judgment. Franco, 2001 UT 25 at f^ 36 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court should 
affirm the PSC's dismissal of Bear Hollow's Complaint for failure to even allege the 
necessary facts that would address whether Summit Water serves the public. 
B. Consistent with Supreme Court Precedent, the PSC Correctly 
Determined That It Could Not Assert Jurisdiction Over Summit Water as 
a Public Utility Because Summit Water Does Not Serve the Public. 
Even were the Court to address factual claims beyond the allegations of Bear 
Hollow's Complaint, the undisputed facts establish that Summit Water serves only its 
shareholders, controls who receives service, and therefore cannot qualify as a "public 
utility" subject to the PSC's regulation. Bear Hollow's appeal arguments on this point 
should be limited to the allegations raised in its request for rehearing (which, again, were 
beyond the allegations included in the Complaint but still not as sweeping as the 
20 
arguments contained in this appeal). See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 ("An applicant [for 
reconsideration] may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in an 
appeal to any court."); accord In re Questar Gas Co., 2007|UT 79, f^ 42, 175 P.3d 545; 
Desert Power, LP v. Public Serv. Commn., 2007 UT App 374, ^ 17, 173 P.3d 218; 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 754 P.2d 41, 46 (Utah 1988) Objection 54-7-15 
states that petitioning parties can only bring those grounds) before this Court that were 
argued in the application for rehearing.") 
Bear Hollow's request for rehearing only argued that Summit Water was required 
to serve the public due to the sales of property with appurtenant shares. (R. 024 at 8). 
Accordingly, that should be the only grounds considered by the Court for examining 
whether Summit Water serves the public. However, Bdar Hollow's additional new 
arguments regarding public facilities, renters, and individual shareholders' sale of shares 
without appurtenant property are similarly unavailing and cannot establish service to the 
general public. 
1. Summit Water Only Serves Shareholders. 
a) Sales of Property with Appurtenant Shares 
Bear Hollow contends that potential sales of land vtith appurtenant water shares 
force Summit Water to serve non-shareholders. (App. Brief at 26-27.) On its face, this 
argument appears logically flawed as these acts would simply add new shareholders to 
those potentially receiving service, not extend service td the general public or non-
shareholders. {See also R. 023 at 14 ("Even if Summit markets its services, and even if it 
is the only provider in some areas it serves, there is no allegation that Summit serves 
21 
anyone other than shareholders.")). If the new shareholders meet the requirements for 
service and Summit Water approves their membership, they then are entitled to receive 
water under the same terms and conditions as other shareholders. 
On appeal, Bear Hollow also contends that the sales of shares without property 
may obligate Summit Water to serve the general public as the company does not control 
such transactions between individual shareholders and third parties. (App. Brief at 28-
30.) This variation of the argument fails for the same reasons as the original - as 
discussed further infra, Summit Water has the power to refuse membership and service to 
anyone who fails to comply with the applicable requirements and company approval. 
Marketing or competing for the business of those seeking water service does not 
necessitate serving anyone who asks. Cf San Miguel, 292 P.2d at 254 ("[AJlthough 
membership may [have] be[en] easily obtained, without such membership no member of 
the general public [was]s legally entitled to sendee."). 
The PSC explicitly rejected Bear Hollow's arguments in this vein, concluding that 
merely marketing membership to non-members and even generally accepting applicants 
did not render the service "open to the indefinite public." (See R. 023 at 14, quoting 
Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573.) As noted by the PSC, the Commission had similarly argued 
in Garkane that the utility served the public and should be subject to regulation because 
"membership in Garkane is easy to obtain and that actually the Corporation solicits 
membership and has apparently accepted thus far all who paid their fee and agreed to 
11
 Summit Water's control over the membership is discussed further infra. 
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pay the monthly minimum." Id. (emphasis added). Hdwever, the Garkane Court 
rejected this contention, holding that: 
So long as the cooperative serves only its owner-members and so long as it 
has the right to select those who become members, ordinarily it matters not 
that 5 or 1000 people are members or that a few or all the people in a 
given area are accorded membership 
Id. (emphasis added in R. 023 at 14). Bear Hollow's only response to the plain language 
of Garkane is the contention that the allegations in Summit Water's antitrust complaint 
prove that the company is a ''for-profit business venture" engaged in selling water to non-
shareholders. (App. Brief at 29-30). ~ Not only is the nc^n-profit inquiry completely 
distinct from determining whether Summit Water serves th^ public, ' but Bear Hollow 
ignores the critical distinction that such transactions resulll in additional shareholders, 
subject to the same rules, regulations, and controls by Summit Water as any other 
shareholders, not the provision of service to non-shareholder$. 
The Garkane Court's jurisdictional concern w^s with selling power to 
nonmembers, who would not be subject to the same controls and owner-consumer 
incentives that obviate the need for regulation. See Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573. Here, 
there is no evidence or factual allegation that Summit Water serves any nonmembers, 
rendering Garkane^ concern inapplicable. Accordingly, the mere fact that some Summit 
Water shareholders may sell their shares, or sell property \fith appurtenant shares, does 
19 i 
~ For the reasons discussed in the Individual Shareholder's brief, that complaint is not 
properly before this Court, nor was it properly before the PSC. 
Bear Hollow's arguments regarding Summit Water's noh-nrofit status are addressed 
separately, infra. 
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not result in Summit Water serving non-shareholders, and cannot be the basis for PSC 
jurisdiction. 
b) Service of Public Facilities or Renters 
Bear Hollow also contends (on appeal, though not in the request for rehearing or 
its Complaint) that Summit Water serves non-shareholder members of the general public 
through its service of public facilities such as a post office, and renters of property with 
appurtenant shares. Although outside the allegations of the pleadings, the PSC 
considered and rejected both these arguments. They should likewise be rejected by this 
Court. 
First, Bear Hollow reiterates its argument that Summit Water serves the general 
public because people may enter (or lease) the facilities that obtain their water from 
Summit Water, and use the water there. Accepting the logic of this argument would 
mean that merely allowing a guest to wash her hands or drink a glass of water grants that 
guest a legal entitlement to receive water service from Summit Water. As the PSC held, 
'The Commission does not agree that because such shareholders in turn deliver water to 
general members of the public - i.e. customers, patrons, tenants, etc., Summit can then be 
considered a public utility or that such allegations show it has established service to the 
public generally." (R. 023 at 13). The Post Office may be a shareholder, but the 
members of the public who use its restroom do not gain a Tegal right to the use of if" or 
to obtain water from Summit Water. See Garkane, 100 P.2d at 572. The only contractual 
right to service is between Summit Water and its shareholders, not the general public. 
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Because the PSC rejected Bear Hollow's legal argunient, Bear Hollow focuses on 
the PSC's alleged failure to consider the allegations "in a light most favorable to Bear 
Hollow." (App. Brief at 31). This argument ignores the PSCf's compelling reasoning that 
none of Bear Hollow's examples of non-shareholders Receiving water service are 
individuals or entities who directly receive service from Summit Water, or have the 
"legal right" to do so. (R. 023 at 13). The "favorable inference" Bear Hollow seeks 
would apply only to assuming the factual allegations are trUe, not glossing over logical 
gaps in its claims. The PSC properly assumed thai renters and shareholders such as the 
Post Office receive water, but concluded that this did not constitute serving the general 
public. 
2. Sales of Shares Do Not Remove Membership Requirements As 
Prerequisites To Obtaining Service. 
Whether Summit Water or any of its individual shareholders engage in marketing 
or sales to non-members, the fact remains that those purchasers would still have to meet 
Summit Water's requirements and approval in order to receive service as a Summit 
Water shareholder. The existence of restrictions on who may receive service 
distinguishes companies like Summit Water, who serve only their members, from entities 
engaged in serving the general public. "The essential feature of a public use is that it is 
not confined to privileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public. It is this 
indefmiteness or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character." Garkane, 100 
P.2d at 573 (quoting Thayer v. California Dev. Bd., 164 Cal. 117, 127, 128 P. 21, 25 
(1912)). 
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Summit Water's membership controls are at least as restrictive as the criteria 
approved in Garkane, where potential members merely had to meet three simple 
prerequisites: payment of a five dollar ($5) membership fee; agreement to pay a monthly 
minimum; and compliance with the company's articles and by-laws upon acceptance by 
the board or other members. Garkane, 100 P.2d at 572. In fact, the Court found that 
membership in Garkane was "easy to obtain" and that apparently everyone who paid their 
fees had been accepted; however, this did not transform the company into one that served 
the public, as it still had the right to select its members. Id at 573; see also San Miguel, 
292 P.2d at 512 (Utah 1956) (finding that company did not serve the public so long as 
membership was required before service, even though membership was easy to obtain 
and the plaintiffs publicly committed themselves to serving "all unserved persons who 
desire such service and meet the reasonable requirements of the cooperatives"). As the 
PSC concluded, "[e]ven if the requirements are minimal, so long as Summit serves only 
its shareholders, it is not serving the public generally." (R. 023 at 13). 
The PSC found that, "[a]lthough Summit might not have the ability to control to 
whom a shareholder sells its interest, Summit does retain the power to reject anyone that 
is not willing to meet the requirements imposed on shareholders." {Id at 13 (emphasis 
added)). Far from disputing this fact, Bear Hollow itself acknowledged that Summit 
Water's bylaws condition the transfer of shares on the purchaser complying with multiple 
requirements before possibly qualifying for water service from Summit Water. (R. 012 at 
n.4). Bear Hollow asserts on appeal that Summit Water "cannot refuse to accept any 
individuals or entities that have purchased or will purchase property...within its sendee 
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district." (App. Brief at 28). This assertion is not present [anywhere in Bear Hollow's 
Complaint, nor is it supported by any citation or factual allegation. Further, the argument 
is flatly contradicted by both the PSCs analysis of Summit Water's Bylaws and Bear 
Hollow's own admission that any purchaser is subject to multiple requirements and 
Summit Water's approval before it can become a member and actually obtain service 
from the company. (See R. 023 at 13; R. 012. at n.4; R. 018 at 5). Accordingly, Summit 
Water's membership requirements and approval process adequately distinguish it from 
entities that serve the general public and may be subject to P$C jurisdiction. 
C. The PSC's Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction Was Also Consistent 
With the Applicable Statutory Exemptions. 
Bear Hollow also contends that, even if Summit Water does not serve the public 
generally, the PSC could not dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction because 
Summit Water does not fall within the statutory exemption for irrigation companies. 
(App. Brief at 32-33). Bear Hollow has simply missed the pbint 
Summit Water is not arguing, and did not argue to the PSC, that it is outside of the 
Commission's jurisdictional reach because it meets the statutory exemption for irrigation 
companies. Rather, the Commission lacks jurisdiction because Bear Hollow failed to 
allege facts establishing that Summit Water is a ""public utility" as defined by Utah Code. 
See generally Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 ("The commission is hereby vested with power 
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility . . . "). As discussed supra, 
in order to be a "public utility" subject to the Commission's!jurisdiction under §54-4-1, it 
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must be shown that Summit Water serves "the public generally."14 Bear Hollow has not 
established this element, and the discussion about "private irrigation companies" is 
simply a red herring. 
Nevertheless, Bear Hollow proffers the tenuous argument that because the Utah 
Code also specifically excludes "private irrigation companies engaged in distributing 
water only to their stockholders," Utah Code § 54-2-l-30(b), the statutory requirement 
that any entity must serve "the public generally" in order to be a "public utility" and 80 
years of judicial interpretation of that requirement should simply be ignored in the 
context of water companies that are not "private irrigation companies." This strained 
statutory interpretation posits that, because irrigation companies who distribute water 
only to their stockholders are excluded from the definition of "water corporation" (Utah 
Code section 54-2-1), the Legislature must have intended to include all other water 
companies who serve only their shareholders within the PSC's jurisdiction. {See App. 
Brief at 32). But see Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(29) ("'Water corporation' includes every 
corporation and person . . . owning, controlling, or managing any water system for public 
service within this state." (emphasis added)). Bear Hollow claims that the irrigation 
company exemption is rendered "unnecessary and superfluous" if a non-irrigation 
14
 See Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(16)(a) ("'Public utility' includes every . . . water 
corporation . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the 
public generally . . . ."); id. § 54-2-1(29) ("'Water corporation' includes every 
corporation and person . . . owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system 
for public service within this state."); Nelson, 238 P. at 239 ("[I]f the business or concern 
is not public service . . . it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the 
commission."). Cf. San Miguel Power Assn. v. Public Service Comm'n., 292 P.2d 511, 
512 (Utah 1956) ("Since plaintiffs cannot legally be required to serve the public 
generally, they are not public utilities and the Commission correctly so decided."). 
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company is also outside the PSC's jurisdiction when it serves only its shareholders. 
(App. Brief at 33). This argument fails on several levels. 
First, Bear Hollow's interpretation would invalidate decades of well-established 
Supreme Court rulings that apply the jurisdictional threshold of serving the public 
generally to all types of potential public utilities, without ciarving out an exception for 
water companies. See, e.g. Garkane, 100 P.2d at 572 (interpreting the identical statutory 
definition of "public utility" with respect to an electrical| corporation in 1940); San 
Miguel Power Ass'n, 292 P.2d at 512 (interpreting the sam^ statutory definition). More 
notably. Bear Hollow's argument particularly ignores the fa<pt that this Court specifically 
has applied this jurisdictional threshold to water companies in the same manner it has 
been applied to other public utilities. See, e.g. Holmgren v.! Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582 
P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1978) (holding that defendant was not £ public utility because it did 
not serve "the public at large," even though it was an irrigation company that served non-
shareholders). In short, there is no statutory or judicial support for adopting Bear 
Hollow's tortuous logic of applying a different interpretation of serving the public when 
dealing with water companies. 
Second, Bear Hollow has not proffered any alternative definition or interpretation 
of the requirement that a "public utility" must be serving! "the public generally." See 
Utah Code §§ 54-2-l(16)(a) & -1(29). Nor has Bear Hollow suggested any practical or 
policy reason why the same statutory definition should b^ applied one way when the 
Court is determining whether an electrical or natural ga^ corporation is serving "the 
public generally" and another when the entity at issue provides water. 
Third, Bear Hollow has not provided any case law or reference to legislative 
history indicating that the legislature's exemption of private irrigation companies was 
intended to alter the determination of whether a private culinary water company was 
subject to the PSC's jurisdiction. (App. Brief at 33). By clearly excluding private 
irrigation companies, the legislature did not indicate any preference for applying a 
different standard observing the public" to water corporations than other utilities. 
Finally, the statute itself demonstrates that the Legislature may employ potentially 
redundant language, either from an abundance of caution or imperfect drafting. For 
example, the legislature refers to the definitional requirement of serving cCthe public 
generally" both in defining a ''public utility" (Utah Code § 54-2-1(16(a)), and also for 
each individual type of public utility, e.g. "water corporations" must own, control 
operate or manage a water system "for public service" {id. § 54-2-1(29)). However, to 
conclude from these redundancies that one of them was contradictory or "superfluous" 
seems unwarranted. To go even further, and claim that the requirement of serving the 
public rather than only a defined subset (such as shareholders) is "superfluous" since the 
Legislature limited that exemption to private irrigation companies seems inexcusable. 
D. The PSC Correctly Dismissed Bear Hollow's Complaint for Lack of 
Jurisdiction Despite the Complaint's Assertion of Conclusory, Irrelevant 
Allegations Regarding Summit Water's Non-Profit Status. 
Bear Hollow's assertions regarding Summit Water's non-profit status are largely 
inflammatory rhetoric that are irrelevant to analysis of the PSC's jurisdiction. For all 
Bear Hollow's alleged concern with potential abuses of the company or its non-profit 
status, it is noteworthy that Bear Hollow does not raise any typical shareholder 
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complaints - there are no allegations that Summit Water charges unfair rates, no claim 
that some shareholders pay less than others for their waljer service, no charges that 
individual shareholders (even the named defendants) have received any bonuses, salaries 
or other payments from the company. This dearth of factual Specificity is a sharp contrast 
to the factual pattern that concerned the PSC in Boulder King. See In re Petition for and 
Order to Show Cause Regarding Exemption from Commission Regulation of Boulder 
King Ranch Estates Water Co. ("Boulder King"). Docket NO. 02-2254-01, Oct. 16, 2002 
(Ex. H to App. Brief). In Boulder King, the allegations were that the subdivision 
developer had personally collected illegal assessments, disenfranchised members who 
were not current in payments, took out a personal loan of $50,000 in the company's 
name, and made false statements to other entities to pressure lot owners into paying him. 
Id. at 4-5. Bear Hollow's only allegation is that some shareholders sell shares, and they 
may profit from those shares. (App. Brief at 37). Importantly, there is no allegation that 
the profit then flows from the individual shareholders to Summit Water. 
Bear Hollow essentially claims that even if the PSC lacks jurisdiction over a non-
public utility, the Commission still should have examined ^ear Hollow's allegations and 
examined the substance of Summit Water's operations. (App. Brief at 35). In support of 
this proposition. Bear Hollow quotes Garkane as holding thjat the entity should always be 
"scrutinize^] closely to determine whether or not... [it] has for its purpose evasion of the 
law." {Id., quoting Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573). However, the full quotation from 
Garkane states that "The courts will always scrutinize closely to determine whether or 
not a certain organization or method of conduct has for its purpose evasion of the law and 
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where it finds such evasion will declare such organization to be what it truly is."1:> Id. 
(emphasis added). Garkane did not charge the PSC with examining a private entity's 
non-profit status or any other details of its internal operations, but left that possibility for 
the courts. Similarly, here the PSC noted that determining if Summit Water has violated 
any laws regarding non-profit corporations, that "is a task for a trial court, not the 
Commission." (R. 023 at 15). Indeed, even if the PSC had determined that Summit 
Water was not a non-profit organization, the PSC still could not have ordered the 
dissolution or reorganization of that entity. Rather, the Commission was created for the 
simple purpose of the "regulation of utility rates." Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public 
Service Comm'n. of Utah, 682 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1984). 
Further, there are no allegations that the scenario envisioned in Garkane as 
necessitating regulation has occurred - Garkane suggested it would be time for the 
Commission to take jurisdiction when the entity has decided to become an "investment 
business venture and sell power to nonmembers..." Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573 
(emphasis added). Bear Hollow characterizes this as the need to "protect consumers who 
otherwise have no say in the rates and operations." (App. Brief at 34). In the instant 
case, there are no allegations that Summit Water shareholders have no say regarding the 
rates and operations of the company. Further, as discussed supra, there are no factual 
15
 Moreover, the Garkane Court found that there was no evidence Garkane was organized 
to evade the law because, "It was organized by a group of consumers who had for years 
desired suitable electric energy in their homes, to procure and transmit to themselves such 
service." Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573. In the instant case, Summit Water was formed and 
exists for an analogous purpose - to provide water service to areas of unincorporated 
Summit County, where there were no other options for many years. 
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allegations that Summit Water serves water to nonmemberk. As a shareholder-owned 
and operated company, Summit Water's corporate structure maintains the common 
incentives and internal controls that negate the potential ne$d for regulation. Garkane, 
100P.2dat573. 
Bear Hollow reasons that municipal utilities and "true cooperatives" are not 
subject to regulation because the consumers they serve have input through municipal or 
Board elections, while Summit Water is free to impose whatever rates it wants. This 
analogy does not serve Bear Hollow well, as Summit Water shareholders also elect a 
Board of Directors who set the rates and assessments paid b^ all shareholders; moreover, 
any director also may be removed from office by a vote of the shareholders. (R. 01, Ex. 
U at Articles VI & XI). It is also apparent that the harm Bear Hollow anticipates from 
this scenario - the company's ability to provide service oh whatever cost or terms the 
utility prefers - is not at issue here. In fact, there are no allegations that Summit Water 
provides water service at rates or terms that are less than equitable (a fact Bear Hollow 
repeatedly glosses over in its hurry to paint the company as a profit-hungry shell for 
exploitation of its shareholders).16 
Aside from the repeated legal assertions, Bear Hollo^v identifies two "uncontested 
allegations" as to how Summit Water is no longer a legitimate non-profit entity. (App. 
Brief at 37). 
16
 Additionally, Summit Waters Articles of Incorporation restrict the ability of the 
directors or the company to assess any inequitable charges (o shareholders by prohibiting 
discrimination between shareholders of the same class and ijequiring that all rules shall be 
interpreted and applied equally. (R.L Ex. U at Article IX). 
First, Bear Hollow claims that individual shareholders Hy Saunders and Stuart 
Knowles have "personally received over $6 million" from selling some of their Class A 
shares. (Id.). Again, there is no allegation that Summit Water has profited at all from 
these sales, which are purely private transactions between individuals. Bear Hollow has 
not alleged that any individual shareholders' profits from selling land or shares flow in 
any way to Summit Water, or alter its fundamental structure and nature. Accordingly, 
there is no basis for assuming that the company is "Tor-profit." Additionally, there is no 
allegation that the shareholders themselves have profited from these sales, as there are no 
allegations regarding the value of contributions made by the shareholders in order to 
obtain the shares. There is no basis for the Court to assume that said transactions were 
conducted at unfair or unduly profitable rates, or to the detriment of the company or its 
shareholders. Moreover, Bear Hollow itself admitted in its Complaint that it entered into 
an agreement to sell some of its Class A shares to an unrelated third party for an 
undisclosed price. (R. 01 at f^ 114). In other words, Bear Hollow has admitted engaging 
in the same activities that it now proffers as evidence of illegal conduct. 
Second, Bear Hollow alleges that the same two shareholders have "maintained 
control over SWDC despite shares of their Class A shares" due to the issuance of 
additional shares. (App. Brief at 37.) This allegation is wholly irrelevant to the non-
profit status of the company. Further, all shareholders are eligible to receive additional 
shares should they comply with the rules regarding contributions to the company. As 
explained to the PSC repeatedly, and as evident in Summit Water's corporate documents, 
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shares are issued only in response to a contribution by th^ shareholder of significant 
assets to further the company's purpose. Specifically, shares are issued upon transfer to 
Summit Water of "approved water rights together with a source site from which potable 
water can be developed." (R. 01, Ex. U at Art. IV, ^ 1). Since its inception. Summit 
Water's bylaws have provided for the issuance of additional shares to any shareholder 
who contributes system expansions to the company, so long as the expansions meet 
Summit Water's requirements. (See R. 012, Ex. A at § 8 (Nov. 3, 1994 Rules and 
Regulations for the Expansion of Summit Water Distribution Company's Water Delivery 
System)). The requirements for acceptance by Summit Water are contained in the 
company's Rules and Regulations. (Id.). Bear Hollow itself has benefited from these 
provisions as a significant number of the shares issued to it in 1998 were based on 
decreed water rights the shareholder conveyed to the company pursuant to Article IV, *[  1 
of the Articles of Incorporation. (R. 018 at 2, n.5). 
Accordingly, even taken at face value, Bear Hollow's allegation does not establish 
either illegal conduct or inequity within the Summit Water shareholders. Mr. Saunders 
and Mr. Knowles have not enjoyed any privilege or status not available to all 
shareholders under the corporate governance documents. Bear Hollow does not even 
allege inequity or wrongdoing, leaving the Court with allegations of nothing but 
shareholders selling shares and receiving additional shares I m accord with the corporate 
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rules. None of this can justify the assertion of PSC jurisdiction in order to investigate 
nebulous claims of Summit Water violating the non-profit standards.17 
II. The PSC's Dismissal of Bear Hollow's Claims for Lack of Jurisdiction Did 
Not Require Formal Rulemaking In Order to Comply with Supreme Court 
Precedent and the Commission's Statutory Authority. 
Despite all of the parties' extensive citation to the underlying statutory framework 
and the well-established body of case law interpreting the jurisdictional limitations of the 
PSC, Bear Hollow maintains that the PSC's dismissal of its Complaint constituted a 
^fundamental policy change" requiring formal rulemaking procedures. (App. Brief at 
45). However, the PSC's decision was merely a clarification of how the Commission 
applied binding Supreme Court precedent and statutory language, not an unexpected 
change in agency rules. Pursuant to section 63G-3-201, rulemaking is not required when 
the agency action "applies only to internal agency management" or "makes 
nonsubstantive changes in a rule." Utah Code Ann. §63G-3-201(4)(a), (d) (2009). The 
PSC's repeal of its internal rule 746-331 was justified in the eyes of the agency because 
"[s]ome of the criteria do not relate to statutory provisions" and, "Application of the rule 
has caused some confusion in the Commission supervision of water companies." (Utah 
17
 Bear Hollow's analysis of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 
960 concludes that the PSC is permitted to rule on questions essential to jurisdiction and 
standing. Summit Water does not dispute this reading of Sierra Club, but notes that it 
begs the question of whether the PSC is authorized to investigate Summit Water's inner 
workings when the Commission has concluded that the condition precedent to 
jurisdiction - serving the public generally - is absent. See, e.g. Nelson, 238 P. at 239 
(absent public service, the Commission's power and jurisdiction are gone). That is the 
true basis for the PSC's decision to dismiss the Complaint without ruling on each of the 
claims raised about corporate governance and possible alter egos. Furthermore, Bear 
Hollow is not left without recourse - it can always raise its corporate claims in a court of 
law, rather than the PSC. 
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State Bulletin, April 15, 2010, Notice of Proposed Rule (Repeal) (hereafter "Notice of 
Repeal"), attached hereto as Exhibit G). Elimination of confusion and coherence with 
authorizing statutes relate to internal agency management, not a change in the 
requirements or obligations of any third parties. Moreover, tiie PSC's explanation of the 
anticipated effects of the repeal further highlights the nonsubstantive nature of the repeal. 
In the Notice of Repeal, the PSC stated: 
Water companies currently subject to the Commission's jurisdiction will 
remain so and will continue to be regulated in the same fashion as prior to 
the rule repeal. There should be no additional savings or costs as there will 
be no change in regulation...The current rule includes consideration of 
criteria which are not directly relevant to the consideration of whether an 
entity is or is not a public utility. Repeal of the rple will not have any 
fiscal impact upon those companies that are public utilities, nor those that 
are not public utilities. 
(Ex. G at 35 (emphasis added)). The PSC added, "Water companies subject to the 
Commission authority will continue to be regulated as in tljie past and water companies 
outside of the Commission's jurisdiction will remain outside the Commission's 
authority." (Id). Accordingly, the repeal of R746-331 merely streamlines the criteria 
that the PSC and staff must employ to evaluate jurisdiction, but will not change the 
preexisting requirement to examine whether an entity is a pdblic utility or not. 
With no change in which water companies will be subject to PSC regulation, it is 
difficult to see the ^fundamental policy change" claimed by Bear Hollow. Regardless, 
Bear Hollow contends that previously the PSC has "consistently" held that water 
companies serving only their shareholders are within its jurisdiction unless all the factors 
of R746-331-1.C were met. (App. Brief at 46). Bear Hfiollow\s sole example of this 
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supposed policy is the 2002 Boulder King matter, where the PSC allegedly held that 
serving only the entity's shareholders could only exempt irrigation companies from 
regulation. (Id. at 46-47). However, the PSC's analysis in Boulder King is on-point with 
its approach in this case. The PSC did note that the irrigation exemption was 
inapplicable, but then it continued with its analysis of whether the water company served 
the public ucas required by statute." (Boulder King, Docket No. 02-2254-01 (Ex. H to 
App. Brief) at 3). The analysis was abbreviated by the fact that the water company 
conceded that it did not have the ability to choose its members and the PSC analyzed 
that concession in the context of Garkane. (Ex. H to App. Brief at 3 ("[Representatives 
of Boulder King agreed that it did not have the ability to choose its members. . . . Boulder 
King cannot choose its members as required by the Garkane decision, and is obligated to 
serve the public within its service area.")). In this case, Summit Water made no such 
concession, and Bear Hollow made no such allegation. Thus, the Boulder King decision 
is simply inapposite. 
Moreover, the PSC's dismissal of Bear Hollow's Complaint was not the first time 
the Commission found that determining whether an entity served the public trumped the 
internal factors listed in R746-331. For example, in November 2009, the PSC ruled that 
18
 Summit Water's situation is distinguished further from Boulder King because Summit 
Water does not have a defined service area, within which all residents are entitled to 
service. Summit Water serves developments and individual lots throughout Snyderville 
Basin, but without boundaries that limit or define its market. Cf. Boulder King (Att. H to 
App. Brief) at 3 (every person or entity that purchases a lot is entitled to service and the 
company **is obligated to serve the public within its service area."). In fact, the Boulder 
King water company even charged lot owners who had purchased "dry lots" without the 
promise of water, demonstrating that they considered their service area limited 
exclusively by geography. See id. at n.l. 
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"even before considering the factors stated by the Division and those in R746-331-1.C, 
the Commission must determine whether the service being provided by the Company is 
provided to the public." In the Matter of the Application of t)eepwater Distrib. Co., Inc. 
for Exemption, Docket No. 09-2516-01, Nov. 30, 2009 (attached hereto as Exhibit H). 
Bear Hollow's only other example of how the P$Cs decision constitutes a 
fundamental change requiring formal rulemaking is alleging} that previously, the PSC's 
jurisdiction included individual shareholders. (App. Brief at n.26). Bear Hollow's sole 
example of this alleged "fundamental policy" is an Order to Show Cause issued to 
Daniels Summit Estates Water Company and its officers. (Ic(., Ex. I). The Order merely 
orders the officers to appear to determine if the company, ndt the officers, was operating 
as a public utility. The PSC did indicate its intent to determine whether the officers 
should be fined for their failure to respond to the Division of jPublic Utilities, but does not 
consider regulating them as public utilities. The Order tcj) Show Cause hardly lends 
credence to Bear Hollow's complaint that the PSC's refusal to regulate Summit Water's 
Individual Shareholders indicated a reversal in longstanding policy. 
Accordingly, nothing indicates that the PSC was obligated to engage in formal 
rulemaking before dismissing Bear Hollow's Complaint for Hack of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Bear Hollow's appeal and 
affirm the PSC's dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction because there are no 
allegations or basis in the record that Summit Water qualifies as a "public utility** subject 
to PSC regulation. The jurisdictional analysis engaged in by the PSC was consistent with 
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well-established precedent and statutory provisions, and did not require formal rule-
making. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2010. 
FLITTON & SWENSEN, P.C. 
John S. Flitton 
Lara A. Swensen 
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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(i), the Individual Shareholder Defendants hereby 
join in the arguments presented by Summit Water, to the extent they are applicable to this 
Court's detemiination of the issues related to the Individual Shareholders. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2010|. 
HATCH, JAMES & DOI^GE PC 
Brent O. Hatch 
Mitchell A. Stephens 
Counsel for the Individual Shareholders 
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Daniel J. McDonald (7935) 
KathrynJ. Steffey (10245) 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 413-1600 
Facsimile: (801) 413-1620 
Attorneys for Applicant/Complainant Bear Hollow Restoration, LL\C 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BEAR HOLLOW RESTORATION, LLC, 
Applicant/Complainant, 
v. 
LEON H. SAUNDERS; LANDMARK 
PLAZA ASSOCIATES; PARLEY'S 
CREEK, LTD.; PARLEY'S LANE, LTD.; 
PARLEY'S PARK; STUART A. 
KNOWLES; TRILOGY LIMITED, L.P.; 
TRILOGY ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.; 
LAND & WATER RESOURCES, INC.; 
LAWRENCE R. KNOWLES 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST; LEON H. 
SAUNDERS, STUART A. KNOWLES and 
TRILOGY LIMITED, L.P. dba SK 
RESOURCES, a Utah general partnership 
and/or joint venture; SUMMIT WATER 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Respondents. 
Pursuant to Sections 54-7-15 and 63G-4-301 of the Utah Code, Applicant/Complainant, 
Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC ("Bear Hollow"), by and through its attorneys of record, 
respectfully submits this Request for Rehearing of the Public Service Commission's Order on 
Motions to Dismiss ("Order"), issued February 4, 2010. (A copy | of the Order is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A.) This Request is timely under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-301. 
REQUEST FOR REHEARING 
Docket No. 09-015-01 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bear Hollow is a shareholder of Class A shares of Summit Water Distribution Company 
("Summit"). On September 10, 2009, Bear Hollow filed its Complaint and Request for Agency 
Action with the Utah Public Service Commission (the "Commission"), requesting, inter alia, that 
the Commission revoke the exemption from Commission regulation granted Summit. Bear 
Hollow's request was based on several factual allegations that demonstrated that two of 
Summit's shareholders, Saunders and Knowles, owned or controlled, either directly or indirectly, 
more than 51% of all outstanding Summit shares and that, through this majority ownership, 
Saunders and Knowles, and the entities owned or controlled by them, have operated and continue 
to operate Summit as a vast for-profit investment scheme. 
Given the fact that Saunders and Knowles had used their majority ownership and control 
of Summit to exploit Summit's resources in exchange for nearly $6,000,000.00 from known 
stock sales transactions at the expense and detriment of the remaining Class A and Class B 
shareholders, Bear Hollow requested that the exemption granted Summit pursuant to Rule R746-
331-1.C be revoked to ensure that the interests of each of Summit's members and consumers will 
be protected. 
The Respondents moved to dismiss the Complaint and Request for Agency Action on the 
ground that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Specifically, the Respondents claimed that the 
Commission had no jurisdiction over Summit because it was a mutual, non-profit water company 
that provided water only to its shareholders. Moreover, the individual Respondents alleged that 
the Commission lacked jurisdiction over individual shareholders of a water corporation, such as 
Saunders and Knowles. 
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The Respondents' motions to dismiss were heard before Administrative Law Judge 
Ruben H. Arredondo on December 8, 2009. Thereafter, on February 4, 2010, the Commission 
issued its Order on Motions to Dismiss, wherein it granted both Respondent Summit's motion to 
dismiss and the individual Respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In that Order, 
the Commission declared, "[a]bsent any allegation that would factually allege that [Summit] 
serves those who are not shareholders, the Commission cannot a$sert jurisdiction—even for an 
investigation, and must dismiss." (Order at 12.) 
ANALYSIS 
1. The Commission's Order Constituted de facto Rule Making and Is Therefore 
Invalid 
Because the Commission's Order on Motions to Dismiss constitutes a clear change in law 
in the Commission's interpretation of its jurisdiction over mutual, non-profit culinary water 
companies, the Order constitutes de facto rule making and is therefore invalid for failure to 
comply with formal rule making procedures. This case is governed by the rule articulated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 7^20 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court declared that "the Commission cannot reverse its long-settled 
position regarding the scope of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change 
without following the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rub Making Act." Id. at 777. 
On April 6, 1998, the Commission enacted Rule R746-331-1, entitled "Conditions for 
Finding of Exemption." The Rule provides that, "[u]pon thf Commission's own motion, 
complaint of a person, or request of an entity desiring a finding pf exemption, the Commission 
may undertake an inquiry to determine whether an entity organized as a mutual, non-profit 
corporation, furnishing culinary water, is outside the Commission's jurisdiction." Utah Admin. 
Code R746-331-1.A. Essential to the determination that a mujtual, non-profit culinary water 
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company is outside the Commission's jurisdiction are the following three findings: (1) the water 
company is a non-profit water company in good standing with the Utah Division of 
Corporations; (2) the water company owns or controls assets necessary to furnish culinary water 
service; and (3) the voting control of the entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a 
complete commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous. 
M R746-331-1.C. 
In interpreting this rule and its statutory grant of jurisdiction, the Commission has 
consistently (until recently) held that culinary water companies serving only their shareholders 
are within the Commission's jurisdiction absent a demonstration of all of the factors set forth in 
R746-331-1.C. For example, In re Petition for and Order to Show Cause Regarding Exemption 
from Commission Regulation of Boulder King Ranch Estates Water Company, Docket No. 02-
2254-01, in response to Boulder King's claim that it did not qualify as a public utility because it 
served only its shareholders, the Commission held as follows: 
Boulder King claims that because it is a nonprofit corporation which serves only 
its owning members with each lot having one vote, that it is not a "public utility." 
We disagree. Boulder King falls within the definition of a public utility. It is a 
water corporation that owns, controls, operates, or manages a water system for 
public service within this state. The fact that it is a nonprofit corporation owned 
by the owners of lots in the Boulder Kings Ranch Estates subdivision does not 
cause it to be exempt from regulation. The statutes set forth above that define 
"water corporation" and "water system" do exempt from regulation systems 
engaged in distribution of irrigation water to their stockholders. There is no 
similar exemption for culinary systems. 
Indeed, although the Utah Legislature has excluded "private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water 
only to their stockholders," Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 (30)(b), the Legislature did not include a similar exclusion for 
private culinary companies. Accordingly, given the Legislature's refusal to extend the statutory exclusion to private 
culinary water companies, the Commission has consistently and properly interpreted its jurisdiction to include non-
profit, mutual water companies "mnushing culinary water.1' Utah Admin. Code R746-331-1.A. 
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See In re Boulder King, Docket No. 02-2254-01, Amended Report and Order, issued October 16, 
2002 (emphasis in original). 
In this case, it appears that the Commission has applied the exclusion found in section 54-
2-l(30)(b) for "private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their 
stockholders" in finding that it does not have jurisdiction over Surtrmit. However, that section is 
not applicable because, as in Boulder King, Summit is not a "private irrigation company" but is 
instead furnishing culinary water to its consumers. Given the Commission's prior interpretation 
of its jurisdiction over culinary water companies that deliver water solely to their shareholders, 
as clearly articulated in Boulder King and set forth in its administrative rule R746-331-1,3 as well 
as over those individuals operating or controlling such entities, the Commission's departure from 
that interpretation in the present case constitutes de facto rule making, which requires the 
Commission to comply with the procedures for formal rule making. Because the Commission 
did not comply with the formal requirements of the Rule Making Act, its Order in this case is 
invalid. See Williams, 720 P.2d at 777. 
Accordingly, Bear Hollow requests on rehearing that the Commission reverse its Order 
and hold that, pursuant to its prior interpretation of Section 54-4-1 and Rule R746-331-1, the 
Commission has jurisdiction over the Respondents sufficient to commence an investigation to 
determine whether Respondents meet all the requirements of ^746-331-1 to qualify for an 
exemption from regulation. 
2
 The Commission has also consistently interpreted its jurisdiction to include the officers and individuals operating 
or controlling a water corporation, such as is alleged in this case against the individual Respondents. For example, 
the Commission has issued Orders to Show Cause to officers of water corporations operating without a certificate of 
convenience. See, e.g., Docket No. 04-2436-01, Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause, issued August 3, 
2004. Thus, the Commission's determination that it cannot exercise control over the mdividual Respondents is 
likewise contrary to its prior interpretation and, therefore, constitutes de facto rile making. 
It should be noted that, because R746-331-1 applies only to an "entit}| organized as a mutual, non-profit 
corporation, furnishing culinary water," it appears that the Commission's rulihg in the present case renders R746-
331-1 a nullity. 
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2. The Commission's Order Is Contrary to the Holding in Garkane 
In addition to representing a departure from its prior interpretation and exercise of 
jurisdiction, the Commission's Order in the present case is also contrary to the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding in Garkane Power Co. v. Public Service Coram 'n, 100 P.2d 571 (Utah 1940). In 
Garkane, the Court held that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over a cooperative 
"provided the arrangement is a bona fide cooperative or private service organization and is not a 
device prepared and operated to evade or circumvent the law." Id. at 573 (emphasis added). To 
ensure that form is not elevated over substance, the Court mandated that the organizations must 
be "scrutinize[d] closely to determine whether or not a certain organization or method of conduct 
has for its purpose evasion of the law." Id. 
In this case, Bear Hollow's Complaint contains numerous factual allegations that 
establish that Saunders and Knowles, and the remaining individual Respondents which are 
owned or controlled by Saunders and Knowles, are operating Summit in such a way as to evade 
or circumvent the law. Indeed, the Complaint alleges that the Saunders/Knowles Respondents 
"operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated by Saunders and Knowles and/or 
the Saunders Entities and Knowles Entities." (Compl. at *[  25.) The Complaint also alleges that 
it appears that immediately after the DPU made its recommendation to the 
Commission that [Summit] not be regulated, based, in part, on the assumptions 
that only 5,000 Class A shares had been issued and that it would take unlikely 
collusion between Class A shareholders to warrant regulation, [Summit] 
immediately issued at least 2,819 more Class A shares to Saunders and Knowles 
and/or the Saunders and Knowles Entities so that Saunders and Knowles and/or 
the Saunders and Knowles Entities could, once again, manipulate and dominate 
[Summit]. 
(Id. at f 44.) Finally, the Complaint alleges that 
Saunders and Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles Entities, and/or SK Resources' 
manipulation of [Summit's] rules, regulations, and practices prohibiting or 
refusing the transfer of the Class A (development) share to the Buyer arbitrarily 
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and unreasonably results in the creation of at least two classes of Class A shares— 
extremely valuable and fungible shares owned by Saundqrs and Knowles and/or 
the Saunders and Knowles Entities, which are readily marketable and not tethered 
to any particular piece of land within the Snyderville Basin, and worthless and 
unusable shares owned by parties such as Bear Hollow, which cannot be sold 
because they are tethered to a particular piece of land that ^oes not need them. 
{Id. atf 119.) 
Given the Utah Supreme Court's mandate that an organization be "scrutinized" to 
determine whether it is, in fact, not a device to evade or circumvent the law, the Commission 
erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over both Summit and the individual Respondents 
without first conducting an investigation into the substance of Pear Hollow's claims that the 
individual Respondents have manipulated and operated Summit fdr their own personal gain.4 
It should be noted that, pursuant to the terms of the Order, ,the Commission has found that 
it does not have jurisdiction to determine whether individual shareholders are owning, 
controlling, manipulating, and dominating a public utility for personal gain because the 
Commission is not a court of equity. (Order at 8-9.) However, such a finding is an abdication of 
the Commission's role to "supervise all of the business of every ... public utility in this state, 
and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are 
necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 54-
4-1 (emphasis added). 
3. The Complaint Properly Alleged Factual Allegations Supporting Jurisdiction 
The Commission dismissed Bear Hollow's Complaint based on its determination that 
Summit does not serve the public generally. (Order at 14.) However, such a determination is 
4
 Indeed, given that the Commission, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rulet of Civil Procedure, "may determine 
jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary' hearing," Anderson v. American Society of 
Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), the Commission ened in simply dismissing the Complaint without 
further investigation into whether the individual Respondents are operating [Summit in such a way as to evade or 
circumvent the law. 
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contrary to the allegations of the Complaint and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those 
allegations, which the Commission must construe in favor of Bear Hollow. See Oakwood 
Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, \ 9, 104 P.3d 1226. For example, the Complaint 
alleges that Summit's Class B (use) shares are "appurtenant to and inseparable from the lot" 
upon which such water is used. (Compl. at \ 76.) As such, Summit cannot preclude a purchaser 
from receiving ownership of the water right appurtenant to the lot. See In re Johnson's Estate, 
228 P. 748, 751 (Utah 1924) ("[Ojwnership of shares of stock in the corporation is but incidental 
to ownership of a water right. Such shares are muniments of title to the water right, are 
inseparable from it, and ownership of them passes with the title which they evidence.") In 
Boulder King, the Commission recognized that such a fact brings a water corporation within the 
Commission's jurisdiction, reasoning as follows: 
At the hearing on this matter representatives of Boulder King agreed that it did 
not have the ability to choose its members. Lot owners in the subdivision are, by 
virtue of their lot ownership, members. Boulder King representatives further 
stated that every person or entity that purchases a lot is entitled service from the 
Company. Boulder King cannot choose its members as required by the Garkane 
decision, and is obligated to serve the public within its service area. 
In re Boulder King, Docket No. 02-2254-01, at 3. 
Because Summit, like Boulder King, Questar, or Rocky Mountain Power, cannot choose 
who it will or will not serve within its service area, the Commission erred in determining that 
Summit does not serve the public generally. 
The Commission also erred in finding that the issues raised in Bear Hollow's Complaint, 
which allege that a small group of majority shareholders are operating and controlling Summit to 
their benefit and to the detriment of the remaining shareholders, "do not involve the provision of 
service affecting consumer interests, or other areas typically under Commission jurisdiction" and 
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"are not within the Commission's jurisdiction." (Order at 9.) Indeed, such a finding is in 
derogation of the Commission's express statutory authority to ensure that no "preference or 
advantage" has been granted "to any person" and that no person, such as Bear Hollow, has been 
subjected to "prejudice or disadvantage." Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-8 (2009). Utah law, not what 
the Commission considers to be typical, defines the jurisdiction, role, and duty of the 
Commission. Consequently, the Commission should reverse it$ ruling and hold that it has 
jurisdiction to enforce its statutory obligation to prevent discriminatory treatment. 
4. The Commission Should Amend Its Order and Consider the Additional Factual 
Allegations Included in the Amended Complaint and Request for Agency Action 
In the event the Commission determines, on rehearing, that Bear Hollow's Complaint 
lacks sufficient allegations to support a finding of jurisdiction, Bear Hollow requests that the 
Commission amend its order to allow consideration of Bear Hollow's First Amended Complaint 
and Request for Agency Action, which has been filed concurrently herewith. Rule R746-100-3 
provides that "[t]he Commission may allow pleadings to be amended or corrected at any time," 
and that "[ijnitiatory pleadings may be amended without leave of the Commission at any time 
before a responsive pleading has been filed or the time for filing tl}e pleading has expired." Utah 
Admin. Code R746-100-3.D. As Respondents have not filed a responsive pleading, the 
Commission should consider Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint. By doing so, the Commission 
5
 It should be noted that the Commission's holding is not supported by the statute. Section 54-2-1(16)(a) defines a 
"public utility" as a "water corporation" that provides service or water to "the public generally." Utah Code Ann. § 
54-2-1(16)(a). A "water corporation," in turn, is defined as "every corporation and person,... owning, controlling, 
operating, or managing any system for public service within this state." Id. § 54-2-1(29). The statute does not 
include any additional requirement that the "control" affect the reasonableness of price and service, as required by 
the Order. (Order at 9.) 
Moreover, even if such a requirement could be read into the statute, Bear Hollow's Complaint clearly 
supports the inference that Saunders and Knowles' control of Summit has affected, and continues to affect, the 
"price and service" of the water delivered by Summit. Indeed, because Saunders and Knowles are able to eliminate 
competition for the sale of Class A shares, (Compl. at j^ 119), they are able ti charge monopolistic prices to those 
desiring to build a residence within the sendee area of Surnmit. This price, which is passed on to the consumer as 
essentially a "connection fee," is, therefore, artificially inflated. 
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will conserve judicial resources by allowing the issues presented in this case, both substantive 
and jurisdictional, to be heard at the same time rather than in two largely duplicative and 
repetitive cases. Additionally, review of Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint may moot any 
need to seek judicial review of the Commission's current Order in the event that the Commission 
determines that the Amended Complaint alleges sufficient factual allegations to support a finding 
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Bear Hollow requests that the Commission amend its Order and 
deem as filed Bear Hollow's Amended Complaint and Request for Agency Action. 
Respectfully submitted this {\ day of March, 2010. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
J. Craig Smith ^ 
Daniel J. McDonald 
Kathryn J. Steffey 
Attorneys for Applicant/Complainant 
Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC 
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Public Service Commission 
Heber M. Wells Building 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and to be mailed, via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Division of Public Utilities 
Heber M. Wells Building, 4th Floor 
160 East 300 South 
POBox 146751 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6751 
John S. Flitton 
Lara A. Swenson 
Flitton & Swenson 
1840 Sun Peak Drive, Suite B-102 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Attorneys for Respondent Summit Water Dist. Co. 
Brent O. Hatch 
Mitchell A. Stephens 
Hatch, James & Dodge, P.C. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for the Saunders/Knowles Respondents 
^ ^ k v ^ f c ^ . 
483 ] -3373-2869/HA566-013 11 
TabB 
EXHIBIT B 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Formal Complaint and 
Request for Agency Action of Bear Hollow 
Restoration, LLC against Leon H. Saunders; 
Landmark Plaza Associates; Parley's Creek, 
Ltd.; Parley's Lane, Ltd.; Parley's Park; 
Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, L.P.; 
Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.; Land and 
Water Resources, Inc.; Lawrence R. 
Knowles Irrevocable Trust: Leon H. 
Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles and Trilogy 
Limited, L.P. d/b/a SK Resources, a Utah 
General Partnership and/or Joint Venture, 
Summit Water Distribution Company, a 
Utah Corporation. 
DOCKET NO. 09-015-01 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
ISSUED: February 4,2010 
SUMMARY 
This matter is before the Commission on two Motions to Dismiss applicant Bear 
Hollow Restoration, LLC's (Bear Hollow) Complaint and Request for Agency Action. The 
Commission has reviewed the moving and responding papers. It also held oral argument on the 
matter on December 8, 2009. John Flitton argued Summit's Motion and Brent Hatch argued the 
individual shareholders' Motion. Craig Smith argued Bear Hollov^s opposition to Summit's 
Motion, and Daniel McDonald argued Bear Hollows' opposition to the shareholders' Motion. 
For the reasons below, the Commission grants the Motions to Disrjiiss. 
By The Commission: 
There are two Motions to Dismiss before the Commission. One made by 
respondents Leon H. Saunders; Landmark Plaza Associates; Parley's Creek, Ltd.; Parley's Lane, 
Ltd.; Parley's Park; Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, L.P.; Trilpgy Asset Management, Inc.; 
Land and Water Resources. Inc.; Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust: Leon H. Saunders. 
Stuart A. Knowles and Trilogy Limited. L.P. d/b/a SK Resources (collectively Shareholders) and 
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a second made by respondent Summit Water Distribution Company (Summit). The 
shareholders and Summit made their Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) ("lack of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter") and 12(b)(2) ("lack of jurisdiction over the person") of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Ut.R.Civ.P. 12(b). 
When considering the Motion to Dismiss and in ascertaining the facts needed to 
establish jurisdiction, the Commission must "'accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider all reasonable inference to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff/" Ho v. Jim \s Enters., 2001 UT 63, % 6 (quoting Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764,766 
(Utah 1991)). However the sufficiency of the facts "must be determined by the facts pleaded 
rather than the conclusions stated." Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 
UT 25,1f 26. see Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbaf 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (in a civil rights case, where 
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was at issue, holding that courts are "knot bound 
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'" )(internal citations omitted), 
and Jackson v. Alexander,465 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir. 1972) (in a matter involving fraud and 
Rule 9, holding that mere legal conclusions need not be accepted as true)1. 
The Commission's Jurisdiction 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 states in relevant part that the Commission: 
is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in 
this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition 
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction . . . . 
1
 See Lundv. Brown, 2000 UT 75, *\\ 26 (holding that interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are "substantially similar" to the federal rules.) 
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A public utility "includes every water corporation . . . where the service is 
performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally . . . ." U.C.A. § 54-2-1(16)(a). 
Water corporation "includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within this 
state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their 
stockholders " U C.A. § 54-2-1(29). Water system 
includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgat^s, pipes, flumes, canals, 
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property 
owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the 
diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, 
appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, fire protection, 
irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other 
beneficial use. 
U.C.A. § 54-2-1 (30)(a). Water system "does not include private irrigation companies engaged in 
distributing water only to their stockholders." U.C.A § 54-2-1 (30)(b). 
'The PSC has no inherent regulatory powers [and]. . . . wany reasonable doubt of 
the existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof/" Williams v. Public 
Serv. Comm >?.. 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (internal citations omitted). 
The Shareholders' Motion 
The shareholders moved to dismiss the Complaint filed with the Commission. 
The shareholders argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction over them, as they were not a 
"public utility" but merely held shares in an entity which Bear Hollow alleged was a public 
utility. The shareholders also argued that even if they individually owned or operated a water 
system, such operation was not for "the public generally/' 
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The shareholders claim that Bear Hollow alleges the Commission has jurisdiction 
because the shareholders hold Class A shared in Summit. The shareholders argue that while they 
might have an interest in Summit as a corporation, they have no interest in or control over the 
specific assets of the corporation (i.e. the water system), and cite to Dansie v. City of Herriman 
2006 UT 23, for support. The shareholders argue that mere interest in a water corporation is not 
enough to convey jurisdiction to the Commission. 
Bear Hollow argues that Summit's reliance on "general corporate law is 
irrelevant." Memo, in Opp. to Shareholders ' Motion, p.2. fn.4. It cites to Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that stock 
in a water company "is really a certificate showing an undivided part ownership in a certain 
water supply . . . ." It then concludes that because Summit's Articles of Incorporation give 
shareholders "a proportionate share but specific interest in the corporation's domestic and 
culinary water", that then gives shareholders "an ownership interest in [Summit's] water 
system"—i.e. its assets. Id. 
Regarding the shareholders, Bear Hollow asks, in part, the following relief of the 
Commission: 
134. Based upon the foregoing. Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the 
Commission commence a Commission inquiry as to whether all the other 
Respondents, including, but not limited to, Saunders, Knowles, the Saunders and 
Knowles Entities, and SK Resources should be regulated as a public utility or qualify 
for exemption from Commission regulation pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule 
R746-331-1. 
135. Bear Hollow requests an order from the Commission finding that the other 
Respondents, particularly SK Resources, are public utilities subject to Commission 
regulation because Respondents—particularly Saunders, Knowles, and SK 
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Resources—are providing culinary water to consumers but none of the Respondents 
is operating as a non-profit corporation, in good standing with the Division of 
Corporations. 
Bear Hollow Complaint and Request for Agency Action (Complaint), ^ 134-135. 
Bear Hollow's claims that the shareholders are subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction are based, in part, on the following allegations: 
• Leon Saunders is Summit's "largest Class A shareholder, its President, and a 
member of its board of directors, Complaint at [^ 3; 
Landmark Plaza Associates is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of Summit, Id. at f^ 4; 
Parley's Creek, Ltd. is owned or controlled by Saunders and is a Class A 
shareholder of Summit, Id. at j^ 5; 
Parley's Lane is owned or controlled by Saunders aitid is a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id at ^ 6; 
• Parley's Park is owned or controlled by Saunders arid is a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id. at f^ 7; 
• Stuart Knowles is a "Class A shareholder and director of Summit and is an officer 
and or owns a controlling interest in Trilogy Limited, Id. at j^ 9; 
Trilogy Limited is owned or controlled by Knowles^ a Class A shareholder of 
Summit, Id at f^ 10; 
Trilog) Asset Management is owned or controlled bfy Knowles. It is the general 
partner of Trilog} Limited, Id at f^ 11: 
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• Land and Water Resources, Inc. is a Class A shareholder of Summit, owned or 
controlled by Knowles, and merged with Trilogy Limited in 2007, Id. at j^ 12; 
• Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust is a Class A shareholder of Summit and 
controlled or managed by Knowles, Id. at J^ 13. 
A review of the allegations in the complaint show that Bear Hollow contends the 
Commission has jurisdiction to commence an investigation and ultimately issue an order finding 
that the shareholders are public utilities, because they own shares in Summit, which Bear Hollow 
claims is a public utility. 
However, Bear Hollow's jurisdictional allegations regarding the shareholders as a 
"public utility", "water corporation," or "water system", are legal conclusions which the 
Commission is not required to accept as true for purposes of determining these Motions. See 
Franco, 2001 UT 25 at % 26, Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, and Jackson, 465 F.2d at 1390. Even 
reviewing the allegations cited at the hearing ( ffl[ 16, 18, 21, 22, 39, 40, 41, 44, see Transcript of 
Hearing, pp. 55-57) there is wo factual allegation that any of them, individually or collectively, 
is a water company serving the public or that any—individually or collectively, own or control a 
water system serving the public. Even assuming the conclusions are true, they allege only that 
the shareholders have shares in Summit, which in turn is allegedly a "public utility", "water 
corporation," or "water system". "'Ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct 
legal entity from its stockholders. This is true whether the corporation has many stockholders or 
only one/" DeGrazio v. Legal Title Co.. 2006 UT App 183, *1 (quoting Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The Court in Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23 (which 
DOCKET NO. 09-015-01 
-7-
both parties cited), dealt with a similar situation. There, the Court clarified that the Herriman 
water company's articles of incorporation entitled shareholders "U) use Company water but gave 
them no ownership interest in Company assets"—that "shareholders are promised equal 
participation not in the ownership, but rather in the use of Company assets." Dansie, 2006 UT 
23, ^ | 2, 8 (emphasis in original). While the shareholders might have an interest in Summit as a 
corporation, that does not, by itself, give them an interest or control over specific assets . In fact 
as Bear Hollow has itself alleged "Class A development shares represent a proportionate but 
specific interest in the corporations" domestic and culinary water, including the contributed 
source site, source, and source capacity, but no interest whatsoevet in the corporation \s water 
distribution works, e.g. water diversion facilities, pipeline, water storage facilities, appurtenant 
works, etc. . . ." Complaint, J^ 77 (emphasis added). The shareholders' mere interest in Summit 
is not enough to convey jurisdiction over them to the Commission, either to commence an 
investigation or to enter an order asserting jurisdiction sufficient tc| regulate them as public 
utilities. 
Bear Hollow argues that it uCdoes not assert that the Commission has jurisdiction 
over the Sanders/Knowles Respondents merely because they own Shares in [Summit]." Memo, 
in Opp. to Shareholders ' Motion, p. 3. Bear Hollow claims the Commission has jurisdiction 
because of a separate reason: "the Complaint clearly establishes that the Saunders/Knowles 
Respondents are named parties to this proceeding based on their control of [Summit], which 
thereby qualifies them as a 'water corporation' pursuant to Section 54-2-1." Memo, in Opp. to 
Shareholders' Motion, p. 3 (emphasis in original). Bear Hollow points to other allegations in its 
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Complaint to show that the shareholders "own or control" Summit." Id. For example, Bear 
Hollow alleges: ''[Summit] is a non-profit in form only. In substance, Summit and [the 
Saunders/Knowles] Respondents operate a vast, for-profit enterprise controlled and orchestrated 
by Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders Entities and Knowles Entities." Id. at f^ 25 
(emphasis in original); together, Saunders and Knowles own and/or control 80.1% of all Class A 
shares and 51.9% of all outstanding shares", Id. at *[  26; [Summit] ... issued at least 2,819 more 
Class A shares to Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles so that Saunders and 
Knowles and Knowles Entities could, once again, manipulate and dominate [Summit]" Id. at f^ 
44. Because "ordinarily a corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its 
stockholders," DeGrazio, 2006 UT App 183 at * 1, Bear Hollow must establish that the 
shareholders, especially Saunders and Knowles, "control", "own", and "manipulate and 
dominate" Summit, i.e. establish a claim of alter ego23 for the Commission to consider 
investigating them as a potential public utility and consider asserting jurisdiction over them. 
However, "the conditions under which the corporate entity may be disregarded [under the alter 
ego doctrine] vary . . . as the doctrine is essentially an equitable one and for that reason is 
particularly within the province of the trial courts Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Co., 355 P.2d 321, 
322 (Utah 1960) (emphasis added). The Commission, however, is not a court of equity, see In 
" At the hearing, Bear Hollow's counsel stated: "Essentially what we're saying there is that they're an alter 
ego; they manipulate, dominate, and control the company . . . . That's basic corporate law, and that's a theory that's 
never been alleged . . . in this forum." 
J
 See Smith v Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, % 36 (defining the alter ego theory as one 
where the corporate form is disregarded "when there is wsuch a unit)' of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist."' internal citations omitted). 
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the Matter of the Complaint of Union Telephone Co. v. Qwest Corporation, 2005 Utah PUC 
LEXIS 255, *3 (stating that "this Commission does not possess equitable powers."), and cannot 
grant the primary relief sought by Bear Hollow, which is to obtain regulation of the shareholders. 
Relative to the exercise of its jurisdiction to regulate public utilities and the 
provision of water utility service, and in determining whether an efttity should be exempt from 
Commission regulation, the Commission does consider "ownership and control of assets" and 
'"ownership and voting control of the entity", Utah Admin. Code R. 746-33 l-l(B)(l)-(2). But the 
Commission looks at "control" affecting the reasonableness of pri0e and service, and from the 
perspective of a water consumer. Issues of price and quality of seirvice rendered to a water 
consumer are areas within Commission jurisdiction and which the Commission may remedy. 
A review of the underlying nature of Bear Hollow's claims, however, show that 
Bear Hollow's claims regarding the shareholder's "control" of Summit is used to lead the 
Commission to intercede in issues involving corporate governance, shareholder disputes, 
contractual disputes, business torts, etc. Issues such as these (although they may have merit) 
which do not involve the provision of service affecting consumer interests, or other areas 
typically under Commission jurisdiction, are not within the Commission's jurisdiction to 
remedy. The Commission concludes, that Bear Hollow's substantive claims are outside the 
Commission's jurisdiction to remedy. 
The parties should understand that the Commission's decision does not make a 
determination as to whether any or some of the shareholders do or do not "own, control, 
manipulate or dominate" Summit, i.e. whether Summit is the altef ego of some or all of the 
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shareholders. Nor does it make any finding as to underlying claims raised by Bear Hollow. It 
only determines the Commission is not the proper forum to remedy the substantive issues Bear 
Hollows raises in its Complaint, as those are properly addressed in a trial court. 
Summit \s Motion 
Summit water also asked the Complaint be dismissed, arguing the Commission 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Summit as no new facts been 
presented, because Summit does not provide water to the general public, and because Summit 
qualified for an exemption in an> case, and an> new investigation should be declined. 
Bear Hollow argues that Summit is subject to Commission jurisdiction because it 
does serve the public generally, it markets its services to the general public, is not operating as a 
true non-profit, and changed circumstances merit a new investigation into Summit. 
Some of the factual allegations regarding Summit deal with its status as a non-
profit water corporation. Bear Hollow claims that although Summit is "organized and registered 
under the laws of Utah as a non-profit corporation", Complaint, % 2, wtit is a non-profit in form 
only" and "operates a vast, for-profit enterprise . . . ." Id at f 25. Additionally, Bear Hollow 
alleges that there are materially changed circumstances and/or newly discovered evidence 
involving alleged lack of control of assets, and alleged changes in share distribution that require 
renewed Commission investigation and, ultimately, regulation. 
For purposes of this Motion, assuming as true the allegations that Summit is a 
"non-profit in form only" and allegations the changes in share distribution disrupt the 
commonality of interest requirement, the allegations must still show that Summit serves the 
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public generally. Service to the public is discussed in a line of opinions cited by the parties, e.g. 
Garkane, Nelson, etc. For purposes of this Order, however, the Commission finds the following 
language from Garkane useful: cwIf the business or concern is not public service, where the 
public has not a legal right to the use of it, where the business or operation is not open to an 
indefinite public, it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation qf the commission. . . ." 
Garkane Power Co., Ine. v. Public Service Commission, 100 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1940). uTt is 
only by the presence of such factor or element that the commission has power or authority to 
regulate or control such business. Eliminating it, its power and jurisdiction are gone/" State ex 
rel Public Utilities Comm 'n v. Nelson, 238 P. 237 (Utah 1925). A review of the Complaint 
shows that although Bear Hollow makes several conclusory legal allegations, alleging Summit is 
serving the public, there is no factual allegation that Summit provides services directly to anyone 
other than shareholders.4 For example. Paragraph 16 and 18 allege simply that Summit is a 
"public utility" and a "water corporation" and that the Commission has jurisdiction over Summit. 
Paragraph 21 does state that Summit "has provided or attempted to provide and fulfill the 
essential public use and purpose of providing water and water service for . . . uses in western 
Summit County, Utah." Complaint, at \ 21. The Commission is sfeemingly required to accept 
this factual allegation as true. A review of the remainder of the Complaint, however, reveals that 
this a legal conclusion. The thrust of the allegations in the Complaint is that Summit provides 
water "in western Summit County", by "selling their Class A shades . . . ." See e.g. Complaint, 
Bear Hollow makes several factual allegations regarding Summit's a^ lle^ ed service to the public in its 
responses to the Motions to Dismiss. However, those allegations are made outride of the pleadings, not in the 
Complaint. The Commission deals with those allegations below. 
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ffl[ 26-39, 41, 45, 59, 73, etc. There is no allegation that Summit delivers its water directly to 
non-shareholders, or any allegations that it directly serves non-shareholders. In fact, paragraph 
26 of the Complaint points to Exhibit A in setting forth its allegation regarding ownership of 
shares. That list, however, is titled "Shareholder List." Absent any allegation that would 
factually allege that Summit serves those who are not shareholders, the Commission cannot 
assert jurisdiction—even for an investigation, and must dismiss. 
Bear Hollow made several factual allegations outside of the pleadings arguing for 
Commission jurisdiction. First, Bear Hollow claimed that Summit pro\ ided water to "public 
facilities, including the Park City School District and the U.S. Post Office" Memo in Opp. to 
Summit Water's Motion, p.4., and that it "provides water service to apartment complexes . . . 
which offer[] apartments for rent to the general public in Park City, Utah, as well as time-share 
resorts . . . ." Id. It stated that consequently, "any member of the public visiting the public 
facilities serviced by [Summit] will receive the water services provided by [Summit], regardless 
of their lack of shares in [Summit]." Id. However, the term "pleading", as defined in our Rules 
of Civil Procedure, does not encompass a motion under Rule 12 nor a response to a Motion. See 
Ut.R,Civ.P. 7(a), (b)(1). Therefore those allegations cannot be properly considered as part of the 
Complaint's allegations. 
Even if the Commission were to consider the allegations in the Memorandum, 
however, they would not be enough to require the Commission to deny the Motions and 
commence an investigation. The basis for Bear Hollow's claims of public service by Summit as 
cited above are based on the shareholder list attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. The 
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shareholder list reveals the School District, Post Office, apartment complexes, and times shares 
mentioned show the entities receive their water as just that— shareholders, not as general 
members of the public. The Commission does not agree that because such shareholders in turn 
deliver water to general members of the public—i.e. customers, patrons, tenants, etc., Summit 
can then be considered a public utility, or that such allegations show it has established service to 
the public generally. None of these contentions allege that anyone other than shareholders 
directly receive service from Summit. 
Second, Bear Hollow also claims another reason io|r the Commission to regulate 
Summit is because it cannot "reserve the power to approve or rejebt any application for 
membership in the Company." Memo in Opp. to Summit Water \s\ Motion, p.3. Although 
Summit might not have the ability to control to whom a shareholder sells its interest. Summit 
does retain the power to reject anyone that is not willing to meet the requirements imposed on 
shareholders. As pointed out by Bear Hollow, Summit's "Bylaws provide that [Summit] must 
transfer the share of stock to the purchaser so long as the purchaser agrees to comply with 
[Summit's] articles and bylaws, pays a small transfer fee and resumption of use fee, and all past 
assessments have been paid." Id. p.3-4, fn.4. Even if the requirements are minimal, so long as 
Summit serves only its shareholders, it is not serving the public generally. See Garkane, 100 
P.2d at 573 (holding that it does not matter that membership is ea£y to obtain "provided the 
arrangement is a bona fide cooperative or private service organization and is not a device 
prepared and operated to evade or circumvent the law.") 
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Third, Bear Hollow also claims Summit is subject to Commission jurisdiction 
because it markets its services to the general public and because "in some areas of Summit 
County served by [Summit], like Jeremy Ranch, [Summit] is the only water service provider." 
Memo in Opp. to Summit Water 's Motion, p.4. The Commission does not believe these factors 
warrant Commission investigation in this matter at this time. The Court in Garkane, in 
delineating between "public use" and ''private use", commented on the then-Commission's 
argument for jurisdiction over Garkane. The Commission argued that Garkane was a public 
utility in part because "membership in Garkane is easy to obtain and that actually the 
Corporation solicits membership and has apparently accepted thus far all who paid their fee and 
agreed to pay the monthly minimum." Id. at 573 (emphasis added). The Court stated that "this 
[did] not. . . change the character of the service to be rendered." Id. "So long as the cooperative 
serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those who become 
members, ordinarily it matters not that 5 or 1000 people are members or that a few or all the 
people in a given area are accorded membership . . . ." Id. Even if Summit markets its services, 
and even if it is the only provider in some areas it serves, there is no allegation that Summit 
serves anyone other than shareholders. It does not serve the public generally and absent that 
''essential feature [i.e. that it is] open to the indefinite public", Garkane, 100 P.2d at 573, the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to commence an inquiry or otherwise assert jurisdiction 
at this time. 
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The allegations that Summit does not in fact operate as a non-profit corporation, 
raises some valid questions.' However, determining if Summit ha$ violated the laws governing 
non-profit water corporations, despite Bear Hollow's own allegations that Summit is a 
"privately-owned mutual water service corporation organized and registered under the laws of 
Utah as a non-profit corporation" Complaint, % 2, is a task for a trial court, not the Commission. 
See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74 at f^ 13. Although there may be merit] to Bear Hollow's claims, the 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to make a determination regarding $uch claims and must grant the 
Motion. 
Pursuant to Sections 63G-4-301 and 54-7-15 of the Utah Code, an aggrieved party 
may request agency review or rehearing of this Order by filing a written request with the 
Commission within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Responses to a request for agency 
review or rehearing must be filed within 15 days of the filing of thp request for review or 
rehearing. If the Commission does not grant a request for review or rehearing within 20 days 
after the filing of the request, it is deemed denied. Judicial review of the Commission's final 
agency action may be obtained by filing a petition for review with the Utah Supreme Court 
within 30 days after final agency action. Any petition for review must comply with the 
requirements of Sections 63G-4-401 and 63G-4-403 of the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
"Mutual irrigation corporations are not organized to make a profit for their shareholders but rather to 
allocate water to shareholders who alread} own the right to use that water." Sajt Lake City Corp. 879 P.2d at 
252. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this 4th day of February, 2010 
I si Ruben H. Arredondo 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 4th day of February, 2010 as the Order on Motions 
to Dismiss of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
/s/ Ted Boyer, Chairman 
V Ric Campbell. Commissioner 
I si Ron Allen, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
G#6^2"U 
TabC 
EXHIBIT C 
UAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Cod^/Constitution | House \ Senate ; -. 
Ifle/Chapfer/Section: \ (GO T O ) 
:ah Code 
tie 54 Public Utilities 
lapter 4 Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities 
:ction 1 General jurisdiction. 
54-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in 
is state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utiKty in this state, and to do all things, 
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ah Code 
tie 54 Public Utilities 
lapter 2 Definitions 
ction 1 Definitions. 
54-2-1. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Avoided costs1' means the incremental costs to an electrical corporation of electric energy or capacity or 
)th that, due to the purchase of electric energy or capacity or both frohi small power production or 
igeneration facilities, the electrical corporation would not have to generate itself or purchase from another 
metrical corporation. 
(2) "Cogeneration facility": 
(a) means a facility that produces: 
(i) electric energy; and 
(ii) steam or forms of useful energy, including heat, that are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or 
>oling purposes; and 
(b) is a qualifying cogeneration facility under federal law. 
(3) "Commission" means the Public Sendee Commission of Utah. 
(4) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission. 
(5) (a) "Corporation" includes an association and a joint stock company having any powers or privileges not 
assessed by individuals or partnerships. 
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or 
her governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this state. 
(6) "Distribution electrical cooperative" includes an electrical corporation that: 
(a) is a cooperative; 
(b) conducts a business that includes the retail distribution of electricity the cooperative purchases or 
derates for the cooperative's members; and 
(c) is required to allocate or distribute savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus on the basis of 
itronage to the cooperative's: 
(i) members; or 
(ii) patrons. 
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative Association, and person, their lessees, 
ustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing 
ectric power for public service or to its consumers or members for dqmestic, commercial, or industrial use, 
ithin this state, except independent energy producers, and except wheje electricity is generated on or 
Lstributed by the producer solely for the producer's own use, or the usfc of the producer's tenants, or for the 
se of members of an association of unit owners formed under Title 5X Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership 
ct, and not for sale to the public generally, and except where the electricity generated is consumed by an 
wner, lessor, or interest holder, or by an affiliate of an owner, lessor, dr interest holder, who has provided at 
ast $25,000,000 in value, including credit support, relating to the electric plant furnishing the electricity and 
rhose consumption does not exceed its long-term entitlement in the plpnt under a long-term arrangement other 
lan a power purchase agreement, except a power purchase agreement jwith an electrical corporation. 
(8) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal proberty owned, controlled, operated, or 
lanaged in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of 
ectricity for light, heat, or power, and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials, apparatus, or property for 
ontaining, holding, or carrying conductors used or to be used for the transmission of electricity for light, heat, 
K 
(9) "Gas corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
>ntrolling, operating, or managing any gas plant for public service withm this state or for the selling or 
rnishing of natural gas to any consumer or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial 
e, except in the situation that: 
(a) gas is made or produced on, and distributed by the maker or producer through, private property: 
(i) solely for the maker's or producer's own use or the use of the maker's or producer's tenants; and 
(ii) not for sale to others; 
(b) gas is compressed on private property solely for the owner's own use or the use of the owner's employees 
a motor vehicle fuel; or 
(c) gas is compressed by a retailer of motor vehicle fuel on the retailor's property solely for sale as a motor 
chicle fuel. 
(10) "Gas plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or 
anaged in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of 
is, natural or manufactured, for light, heat, or power. 
(11) "Heat corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
mtrolling, operating, or managing any heating plant for public sendee jvithin this state. 
(12) (a) "Heating plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, machinery, appliances, and personal property 
mtrolled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, 
^livery, or furnishing of artificial heat. 
(b) "Heating plant" does not include either small power production facilities or cogeneration facilities. 
(13) "Independent energy producer" means every electrical corporatibn, person, corporation, or government 
itity, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, that own, operate, control, or jnanage an independent power 
roduction or cogeneration facility. 
(14) "Independent power production facility" means a facility that: 
(a) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable 
source, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources; or 
(b) is a qualifying power production facility. 
(15) "Private telecommunications system" includes all facilities for the transmission of signs, signals, writing, 
lages, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature by \yire, radio, lightwaves, or other 
ectromagnetic means, excluding mobile radio facilities, that are ownedj controlled, operated, or managed by a 
>rporation or person, including their lessees, trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, for the use 
: that corporation or person and not for the shared use with or resale to any other corporation or person on a 
gular basis. 
(16) (a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corpqration, electrical corporation, 
stribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, 
ater corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in 
absection (16)(d), where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in 
Le case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any 
.ember or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial or industrial use. 
(b) (i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation 
)rporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation,! 
ascribed in Subsection (16)(d), performs a sentice for or delivers a con}: 
* a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described 
)rporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or 
)mmercial, or industrial use, for which any compensation or payment 
iblic utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commissic 
commission 
consumer 
, telephone corporation, telegraph 
or independent energy producer not 
modity to the public, it is considered to 
and this title. 
|in Subsection (16)(d), or electrical 
rs within the state, for domestic, 
ts received, it is considered to be a 
In and this title. 
m o » J \ ^ ^ . U 
and regulations of the commission with 
governed by this tide in respect only to the public utility owned, controlled, operated, or managed by the 
>rporation or person, and not in respect to any other business or pursdit. 
(d) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction 
spect to an independent power production facility if it meets the requirements of Subsection (16)(d)(i), (ii), (iii), 
* (iv), or any combination of these: 
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy producer solely for 
it uses exempted in Subsection (7) or for the use of state-owned facilifies; 
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer solely to an electrical corporation or 
:her wholesale purchaser; 
(iii) (A) the commodity or sendee produced or delivered by the independent energy producer is delivered to 
1 entity that controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with the independent energy producer or to a user located 
1 real property managed or controlled by the independent energy producer; and 
(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is cbntiguous to real property which is 
vned or controlled by the independent energy producer. Parcels of real property separated solely by public 
>ads or easements for public roads shall be considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection (16); or 
(iv) the independent energy producer: 
(A) supplies energy for direct consumption by a customer that is: 
(I) a county, municipality, city, town, other political subdivision, local district, special service district, state 
stitution of higher education, school district, charter school, or any entity within the state system of public 
lucation; or 
(II) an entity qualifying as a charitable organization under 26 U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3) operated for religious, 
laritable, or educational purposes that is exempt from federal income tax and able to demonstrate its tax-
cempt status; 
(B) supplies energy to the customer through use of a customer generation system, as defined in Section 54-
>-102, for use on the real property where the customer generation system is located; 
(C) supplies energy using a customer generation system designed to Supply the lesser of: 
(I) no more than 90% of the average annual consumption of electricity by the customer at that site, based on 
l annualized billing period; or 
(II) the maximum size allowable under net metering provisions, defined in Section 54-15-102; 
(D) notifies the customer before installing the customer generation system of: 
(I) all costs the customer is required to pay for the customer generation system, including any 
terconnection costs; and 
(II) the potential for future changes in amounts paid by the customer for energy received from the public 
ility and the possibility of changes to the customer fees or charges to the customer associated with net 
Letering and generation; 
(E) enters into and performs in accordance with an interconnection agreement with a public utility providing 
tail electric sendee where the real property on which the customer generation system is located, with the rates, 
rms, and conditions of the retail service and interconnection agreement subject to approval by the governing 
ithority of the public utility, as defined in Subsection 54-15-102(8); an|d 
(F) installs the relevant customer generation system by December 31, 2015. 
(e) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation oit public utility under this section may 
)ntinue to serve its existing customers subject to any order or future determination of the commission in 
ference to the right to serve those customers. 
(f) (i) "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public utility under this 
ibsection (16) solely because of that person's ownership of an interest in an electric plant, cogeneration facility, 
: small power production facility in this state if all of the following conditions are met: 
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, 
ased to: 
jor small power production facility is 
(II) a person or government entity that is exempt from commission regulation as a public utility; or 
(III) a combination of Subsections (16)(f)(1)(A)(I) and (II); 
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection (16)(|E)(1)(A) is: 
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; or 
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or mdirecdy by another person 
gaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; and 
(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or determined by revenues or 
come of the lessee. 
(11) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility uhder Subsection (16)(f)(i) shall continue 
be so exempt from classification following termination of the lessee's right to possession or use of the electric 
ant for so long as the former lessor does not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the electric plant 
the former lessor operates the electric plant or sells electricity, the fonhier lessor shall continue to be so 
empt for a period of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. 
11s period may not exceed one year. A change m rates that would otherwise require commission approval may 
)t be effective during the 90-day or extended period without commission approval 
(g) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for, but has no ownership interest in 
electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility 
ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, 
a third-party financer of an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility, then that 
lrd-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 9t) days following the foreclosure, or for a 
In the event of a foreclosure in which 
, or cogeneration facility is transferred 
nger period that is ordered by the commission. This period may not exceed one year. 
(h) (1) The distribution or transportation of natural gas for use as a motor vehicle fuel does not cause the 
stnbutor or transporter to be a "public utility," unless the commission, after notice and a public hearing, 
termmes by rule that it is in the public interest to regulate the distributers or transporters, but the retail sale 
3ne of compressed natural gas as a motor vehicle fuel may not cause the seller to be a "public utility." 
(11) In determining whether it is m the public interest to regulate the <fkstnbutors or transporters, the 
immission shall consider, among other things, the impact of the regulation on the availability and price of 
itural gas for use as a motor fuel. 
(1) "Public utility" does not include any corporation, cooperative association, or person, their affiliates, 
5sees, trustees, or receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing an electric plant or in any way 
rnishmg electricity if the electricity is consumed by an owner, lessor, or interest holder or by an affiliate of an 
vner, lessor, or interest holder, who has provided at least $25,000,000 in value, including credit support, 
latmg to the electric plant furnishing the electricity and whose consumption does not exceed its long-term 
Ltitlement in the plant under a long-term arrangement other than a power purchase agreement, except a power 
irchase agreement with an electrical corporation 
(17) "Purchasing utility" means any electrical corporation that is required to purchase electricity from small 
>wer production or cogeneration facilities pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U S C 
ction 824a-3 
(18) "Qualifying power producer" means a corporation, cooperative association, or person, or the lessee, 
astee, and receiver of the corporation, cooperative association, or person, who owns, controls, operates, or 
anages any qualifying power production facility or cogeneration facility. 
(19) "Qualifying power production facility" means a facility that 
(a) produces electrical energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable 
source, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources; 
(b) has a power production capacity that, together with any other facilities located at the same site, is no 
eater than 80 megawatts, and 
(c) is a qualifying small power production facility under federal law 
(20) "Railroad" includes even commercial, mterurban, and other railway, other than a street railway, and each 
anch or extension of a railwa\, b^ any power operated, together with jill tracks, bridges, trestles, nghts-of-wa\, 
^ v y * * j ^ , t , v * * * * * v ^ , ^ i ^ i ^ v ^ ^ , v ^ v ^ w ^ , v**** w ^ ^ * ^ w v ^ , y ^ ^ ^ - c , £ , - — ^ ^ , * , ^ ^ ^ 
[uipment, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property of ef ery kind used in connection with a 
ilway owned, controlled, operated, or managed for public service in th^ transportation of persons or property. 
(21) "Railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
vning, controlling, operating, or managing any railroad for public service within this state. 
(22) (a) "Sewerage corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
vning, controlling, operating, or managing any sewerage system for public sendee within this state. 
(b) "Sewerage corporation" does not include private sewerage companies engaged in disposing of sewage 
lly for their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other 
rvernmental units created or organized under any general or 
fecial law of this state. 
(23) "Telegraph corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, 
vning, controlling, operating, or managing any telegraph line for public service within this state. 
(24) "Telegraph line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cablesl instruments, and appliances, and all 
her real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or 
• facilitate communication by telegraph, whether that communication be had with or without the use of 
ansmission wires. 
(25) (a) "Telephone corporation" means any corporation or person, and their lessees, trustee, receivers, or 
ustees appointed by any court, who owns, controls, operates, manages, or resells a public telecommunications 
rvice as defined in Section 54-8b-2. 
(b) "Telephone corporation" does not mean a corporation, partnership, or firm providing: 
(l) intrastate telephone service offered by a provider of cellular, personal communication systems (PCS), or 
her commercial mobile radio sendee as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332 that has been issued a covering license 
j the Federal Communications Commission; 
(ii) Internet sendee; or 
(iii) resold intrastate toll sendee. 
(26) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all 
her real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or 
) facilitate communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or without the use of 
ansmission wires. 
(27) "Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with or incidental to the safety, 
)mfort, or convenience of the person transported, and the receipt, carriage, and delivery of that person and 
iat person's baggage. 
(28) "Transportation of property" includes every service in connection with or incidental to the 
ansportation of property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, 
*ntilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and hauling, and the transmission of credit by express 
)mpanies. 
(29) "Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
)ntrolling, operating, or managing any water system for public sendee within this state. It does not include 
rivate irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, 
ater conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any 
>neral or special law of this state. 
(30) (a) "Water system" includes all resenroirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates, pipes, flumes, canals, 
ructures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, 
r managed in connection with or to facilitate the diversion, developmqnt, storage, supply, distribution, sale, 
irnishmg, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of whiter for power, fire protection, irrigation, 
clamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use. 
(b) "Water system" does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their 
ockholders. 
(31) "Wholesale electrical cooperative" includes every electrical corporation that is: 
l a y 111 LllV^ L^U.0111V_-00 W l L11V_ W i U J l C O a i V ^ V J . 1 0 L J - 1 1 _ ^ U I L - I V ^ 1 1 \JL C l V ^ ^ U l ^ l L y i t 11CIO LV»J*..L\^ll£lO\^\J. WJL fcLV^llV^J-O.LV-VJ. L.VJ J.LO l l l C l l l U V - i - O 
id the public; and 
(b) required to distribute or allocate savings in excess of additions toireserves and surplus to members or 
itrons on the basis of patronage. 
mended by Chapter 302, 2010 General Session 
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:fect of commission decisions. 
54-7-15. Review or rehearing by commission -- Application — Procedure — Prerequisite to court 
:tion — Effect of commission decisions. 
(1) Before seeking judicial review of the commission's action, any party, stockholder, bondholder, or other 
Tson pecuniarily interested in the public utility who is dissatisfied with an order of the commission shall meet 
e requirements of this section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decision has been made by the commission, any party to the action or proceeding, 
Ly stockholder, bondholder, or other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected may apply for 
hearing of any matters determined in the action or proceeding. 
(b) An applicant may not urge or rely on any ground not set forth in the application in an appeal to any 
>urt. 
(c) Any application for rehearing not granted by the commission within 20 days is denied. 
(d) (i) If the commission grants any application for rehearing without suspending the order involved, the 
>mmission shall issue its decision on rehearing within 20 days after final submission. 
(ii) If the commission fails to render its decision on rehearing within 20 days, the order involved is affirmed. 
(e) Unless an order of the commission directs that an order is stayed or postponed, an application for review 
• rehearing does not excuse any corporation or person from complying with and obeying any order or decision 
:
 the commission. 
(3) Any order or decision on rehearing that abrogates, changes, or modifies an original order or decision has 
ie same effect as an original order or decision, but does not affect any right, or the enforcement of any right, 
ising from the original order or decision unless ordered by the commission. 
(4) An order of the commission, including a decision on rehearing: 
(a) has effect only with respect to a public utility that is an actual party to the proceeding in which the order 
rendered; and 
(b) does not determine any right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with respect 
> a public utility that is not a party to the proceeding in which the order is rendered unless, in accordance with 
absection 63G-3-201(6), the commission makes a rule that incorporates the one or more principles of law that: 
(i) are established by the order; 
(ii) are not in commission rules at the time of the order; and 
(iii) affect the right, privilege, obligation, duty, constraint, burden, or responsibility with respect to the public 
dlity. 
mended by Chapter 347, 2009 General Session 
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63G-3-201. When rulemaking is required. 
(1) Each agency shall: 
(a) maintain a current version of its rules; and 
(b) make it available to the public for inspection during its regular business hours. 
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each agency shall make rules when agency action: 
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action; 
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit; 
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency; and 
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute. 
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a written interpretation of a state or federal legal 
andate. 
(4) Rulemaking is not required when: 
(a) agency action applies only to internal agency management, inmates or residents of a state correctional, 
agnostic, or detention facility, persons under state legal custody, patients admitted to a state hospital, members 
" the state retirement system, or students enrolled in a state education Institution; 
(b) a standardized agency manual applies only to internal fiscal or administrative details of governmental 
itities supervised under statute; 
(c) an agency issues policy or other statements that are advisory, informative, or descriptive, and do not 
mform to the requirements of Subsections (2) and (3); or 
(d) an agency makes nonsubstantive changes in a rule, except that the agency shall file all nonsubstantive 
langes in a rule with the division. 
(5) (a) A rule shall enumerate any penalty authorized by statute that riiay result from its violation, subject to 
absections (5)(b) and (c). 
(b) A violation of a rule may not be subject to the criminal penalty of a class C misdemeanor or greater 
ffense, except as provided under Subsection (5)(c). 
(c) A violation of a rule may be subject to a class C or greater criminal penalty under Subsection (5)(a) when: 
(i) authorized by a specific state statute; 
(ii) a state law and programs under that law are established in order for the state to obtain or maintain 
rimacy over a federal program; or 
(iii) state civil or criminal penalties established by state statute regarding the program are equivalent to or less 
lan corresponding federal civil or criminal penalties. 
(6) Each agency shall enact rules incorporating the principles of law hot already in its rules that are 
>tablished by final adjudicative decisions within 120 days after the decision is announced in its cases. 
(7) (a) Each agency may enact a rule that incorporates by reference: 
(i) all or any part of another code, rule, or regulation that has been adopted by a federal agency, an agency or 
olitical subdivision of this state, an agency of another state, or by a nationally recognized organization or 
ssociation; 
(ii) state agency implementation plans mandated by the federal government for participation in the federal 
rogram; 
(iii) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that are subject to frequent change, fully described in the 
ale, and are available for public inspection; or 
(iv) lists, tables, illustrations, or similar materials that the director determines are too expensive to reproduce 
the administrative code. 
(b) Rules incorporating materials by reference shall: 
(i) be enacted according to the procedures outlined in this chapter; 
(ii) state that the referenced material is incorporated by reference; 
(iii) state the date, issue, or version of the material being incorporatecj; and 
(iv) define specifically what material is incorporated by reference and identify any agency deviations from it. 
(c) The agency shall identify any substantive changes in the material incorporated by reference by following 
i rulemaking procedures of this chapter. 
(d) The agency shall maintain a complete and current copy of the referenced material available for public 
new at the agency and at the division. 
(8) (a) This chapter is not intended to inhibit the exercise of agency discretion within the limits prescribed by 
itute or agency rule. 
(b) An agency may enact a rule creating a justified exception to a rulel 
(9) An agency may obtain assistance from the attorney general to ensure that its rules meet legal and 
nstitutional requirements. 
nended by Chapter 347, 2009 General Session 
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DARFileNo 33513 NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULES 
length may be used on vapor and liquid return lines only The hose 
shall be secured and routed in a safe and professional manner, 
marked with the date of installation, and shall be replaced every five 
years from that installation date 
8 6 9 NFPA, Standard 58, Section 6 25 3 2, the last 
sentence of the section is deleted and rewritten as follows Existing 
installations shall comply with this requirement by March 31, 2011 
8 6 10 NFPA, Standard 58, Section 8 4 1 1(1) is amended 
as follows On line one remove "5ft (1 5m)" and replace it with "10 
ft (3m)" 
R710-6-9. Penalties. 
9 1 Civil penalties for violation of any rule or referenced 
code shall be as follows 
9 1 1 Concern failure to license - $210 00 to $900 00 
9 1 2 Person failure to obtain LPG Certificate - $30 00 to 
$90 00 
9 1 3 Failure of concern to obtain LPG Certificate for 
employees who dispense LPG - $210 00 to $900 00 
9 1 4 Concern doing business under improper class -
$140 00 to $600 00 
9 1 5 Failure to notif\ SFM of change of address - $60 00 
9 1 6 Violation of the adopted Statute oi Rules - $210 00 
to $900 00 
9 2 Rationale 
9 2 1 Double the fee plus the cost of the license 
9 2 2 Double the fee plus the cost of the certificate 
9 2 3 Double the fee plus the cost of the license 
92 4 Double the fee 
9 2 5 Based on two hours of inspection fee at $30 00 per 
hour 
9 2 6 Triple the fee 
KEY: liquefied petroleum gas 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: [March 
24r^£]IVlay24.2010 
Notice of Continuation: March 30, 2006 
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 53-7-305 
Public Service Commission, 
Administration 
R746-331 
Determination of Exemption of Mutual 
Water Corporations 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE 
(Repeal) 
DAR FILE NO 33472 
FILED 03/22/2010 
RULE ANALYSIS 
PURPOSE OF THE RULE OR REASON FOR THE 
CHANGE The current rule addresses a process and criteria 
by which the Public Service Commission (Commission) would 
determine whether a water company is or is not within the 
Commission's regulatory jurisdiction Some of the criteria do 
not relate to statutory provisions Application of the rule has 
caused some confusion in Commission supervision of water 
companies Repeal of the rule and direct application of the 
statutory provisions is now viewed by the Commission as the 
better course to follow 
SUMMARY OF THE RULE OR CHANGE Rule R746-331 
will be repealed in its entirety 
STATUTORY! OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR 
THIS RULE Section 54-4-1 and Subsection 54-2-1(16) 
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO 
• THE STATE BUDGET No costs or savings are anticipated 
Resolution oil whether a water company is or is not within the 
Commission'^ jurisdiction will continue to be made through 
review of material and application of statutory provisions to 
factual circumstances as has occurred in the past 
• LOCAL GOVERNMENTS No costs or savings will occur 
The Commission has no regulatory authority over municipal 
water services provided by municipal utilities operated by 
local government entities 
• SMALL BUSINESSES No additional costs or savings are 
anticipated Water companies subject to Commission 
authority will continue to be regulated as in the past and 
water companies outside of the Commission's jurisdiction will 
remain outside the Commission's authority 
• PERSONS OTHER THAN SMALL BUSINESSES, 
BUSINESSES, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
Water companies currently subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction will remain so and will continue to be regulated in 
the same fashion as prior to the rule repeal There should be 
no additional savings or costs as there will be no change in 
regulation 
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS There 
will be no Change in compliance costs Determination of 
whether a water company is or is not subject to Commission 
authority will continue to be made, but upon the provisions of 
Title 54 
COMMENT? BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD ON THE 
FISCAL IMPACT THE RULE MAY HAVE ON BUSINESSES 
The currentj rule includes consideration of criteria which are 
not directly Relevant to the consideration of whether an entity 
is or is not a public utility Repeal of the rule will not have any 
fiscal impact upon those companies that are public utilities, 
nor those thpt are not public utilities 
THE FULL TEXT OF THIS RULE MAY BE INSPECTED, 
DURING REGULAR BUSINESS HOURS AT 
PLfBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
ADMINISTRATION 
"^  UTAH STATE Bl LLETI\ April 15 2010 Vol 2010 No 8 
NOTICES OF PROPOSED RULES DAR File No 33472 
HEBER M WELLS BLDG 
160 E 300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111-2316 
or at the Division of Administrative Rules 
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS RULE TO 
• Sandy Mooy by phone at 801-530-6708, by FAX 
801-530-6796, or by Internet E-mail at smooy@utah gov 
at 
INTERESTED PERSONS MAY PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON 
THIS RULE BY SUBMITTING WRITTEN COMMENTS NO 
LATER THAN AT 5 00 PM ON 05/17/2010 
THIS RULE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE ON 05/24/2010 
AUTHORIZED BY Sandy Mooy, Legal Counsel 
R746. Public Service Commission, Administration. 
[R746-331. Determination of Exemption of Mutual Water 
Corporations. 
R746-331-1. Conditions for Finding of Exemption. 
3—ownership and voting control of the entity—To elicit 
this information, the Commi33ion may adopt a questionnaire asking 
for the information in form and in detail that the Commission shall 
ftftd—necessary to—make—it3 jurisdictional—determination,—the-
quc3tionnairc may include a requirement that documentation be 
furnished therewith, including copies of articles of incorporation 
and effective amendments thereto, filed with the Utah Division of 
Corporation and certified by that agency, together with a certificate 
of good standing therewith 
G—If, on the basis of the information elicited, the 
Commi33ion—find3—that—the—entity—is—an—existing—non-profit 
coipotation, in good standing with the Division of Coiporation3, 
that the entity own3 or otherwise adequately controls the assets 
necessary to furni3h culinary water service to—its members, 
including watcjr 30urcc3 and plant, and that voting control of the 
entity 13 distributed in a way that each member enjovs a complete 
commonaht) Of interest, a3 a consumer such that rate regulation 
would be supqifluous, then the Commission 3hall issue its finding 
that the entity is exempt from Commission jurisdiction and the 
proceeding shall end—l33uancc of the finding shall not preclude 
another—Commission—inquiry—at—a—latef—ttme—rf—changed 
circumstances or latci-discovered facts warrant anothei inqiiiiv 
B—If, on the ba3is of the information elicited, the 
Commission determines that the entity is subject to Commission 
jurisdiction,—fhe—Commission—shaH—initiate—the—proceedings, 
A—Upon the Commission's own motion, complaint of a 
person, or request of an entity desiring a finding of exemption, the 
Commission may undertake an inquiry to determine whether an 
entity organized as a mutual, non-profit corporation, furnishing including an Carder to Show Cause, a3 3hall be necessary to a33crt 
culinary water, is outside the Commission's jurisdiction 
B—In conducting the inquiry, the Commission shall elicit 
information from the subject of the inquiry concerning 
1—the organizational form of the entity and its compliance 
3tatu3 with the Utah Division of Corporations, 
3—ownership and control of assets necessary to furnish 
culinaiy water service, including water sources and plant, 
Commi33ion jurisdiction 
KEY*, mutual water corporations*, public utilities, water 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment:—April 6, 
1QQQ 
Notice of Continuation: April 1,2008 
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 54-2-1] 
End of the Notices of Proposed Rules Section 
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EXHIBIT H 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSiqN OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Application of Deepwater 
Distribution Company, Inc. for Exemption 
DOCKET NO. 09-2516-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
ISSUED: November 30, 2009 
SYNOPSIS 
On August 11, 2009, the Commission entered an order denying Deepwater 
Distribution Company, lire's (Company) application for exemption. The Company requested 
agency review and rehearing, requesting the Commission vacate its decision and grant its 
application for exemption. The Commission granted review and hdd rehearing. With this order 
the Commission vacates its previously entered order denying exemption, and grants the 
Company's application for exemption. 
By the Commission: 
This matter is before us on the Company's request fbr review and rehearing. The 
Company applied for exemption on or about January 13, 2009. The Division of Public Utilities 
(Division) commenced an investigation of the Company's application, including reviewing the 
application, requesting data requests, and conversing with a member of the Company's board 
and its attorney. The Division on July 14, 2009 submitted its recommendation urging us to deny 
the application for exemption and assert jurisdiction over the Company. Following the 
Division's recommendation, on August 11, 2009, we denied the exemption and ordered the 
Division to move for an order to show cause to assert jurisdiction over the Company. 
Subsequent to the issuance of August 11, 2009 order, the Company petitioned us for review and 
rehearing of that order. We granted the petition for review and rehearing. 
DOCKET NO. 09-2516-01 
- 2 -
We directed the administrative law judge of the Commission to hold a rehearing 
in the matter on Monday, November 9, 2009. Appearing for the Company were attorneys for the 
Company, John Flitton and Lara Swensen. Appearing for the Division, was assistant attorney 
general Patricia Schmid. 
The Division, in its response to the Company's Request for Review and 
Rehearing, stated that the Company's request should be denied as our order denying exemption 
was merely "preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate" agency action, and that the 
order to show cause proceeding merely commenced a formal "proceeding, through which the 
necessity of a Certificate for Deep water will be explored.** We disagree with the Division, 
however. The Division's own recommendation asked us to deny the exemption and order it to 
move for an order to show cause "addressing the required certification obligations of 
Deepwater." The Division further conclusively stated that "exemption from regulation is not 
warranted, and that regulation of Deepwater is necessary." The Division's own 
recommendation does not show that it intended to now move to an additional formal proceeding 
to determine if the exemption was appropriate. The Division's argument in response to the 
request for review and rehearing would be inconsistent with R746-331-1.D which states that if 
we "determine that the entity is subject to Commission jurisdiction, the Commission shall initiate 
the proceedings, including an Order to Show Cause, as shall be necessary to assert Commission 
jurisdiction." The Rule does not, once the exemption is denied, require us to then move to a 
formal proceeding to determine if exemption is warranted. It requires us to assert jurisdiction. 
The determination made in the August 11, 2009 order was not "preliminary, preparatory, 
procedural, or intermediate" with regards to the Company's exemption. 
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The Division's basis for recommending denial of the application for exemption 
can be summarized in the following opening statement of its reconimendation: 
The Division's main concerns focus on the lack of specificity concerning 
potential shareholders, the Company's three classes of shares, with varying 
responsibilities for costs incurred, and that a shareholder's voting rights are 
directly proportionate to the number of water share^ held. Given these 
circumstances, and the high degree of uncertainty concerning future development 
and assignment of shares, the Division does not believe Ithat the Company has 
shown that each member enjoys a complete commonality of interest as a 
consumer that would make rate regulation superfluous, as required by 
Commission rule to support an exemption. Thus, the Division recommends that 
the exemption request be denied. 
Division Recommendation, p.l. 
In its arguments at rehearing, and its petition for review and rehearing, the 
Company argued that the "the key factor in defining an entity as a 'public utility' turns on the 
question of whether or not the goods or services are provided to the public generally as 
distinguished from mere private service." Company Request for Agency Review and Rehearing, 
p.2. Citing State ex rel. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Nelson, the Company reiterated that "if the 
business or concern is not public service, where the public has a legal right to the use of it, where 
the business or operation is not open to an indefinite public, it is not subject to the jurisdiction or 
regulation of the commission . . . ." 238 P. 237, 239 (Utah 1925). 
The Division contends that "lack of specificity concerning potential 
shareholders", "varying responsibilities for costs incurred" among shareholders, and "high 
degree of uncertainty concerning future development and assignnient of shares" require 
Commission jurisdiction. However, even before considering the factors stated by the Division 
and those in R746-331-1 .C, the Commission must deterrtiine whether the service being provided 
by the Company is provided to the public. Here there is no dispute that the water service 
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provided by the Company is limited to its 24 shareholders and not delivered to the public. The 
Division provided no evidence—either in its recommendation or at the rehearing, that the 
Company was providing service to the public generally. In fact, it admitted that the only persons 
receiving service were shareholders. The Division argued that because the requirements for 
becoming a shareholder were merely "ministerial", the Company should be subject to 
Commission oversight. However, as stated in Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, it does not matter that 
membership . . . is easy to obtain . . . [or] that 5 or 1000 people are members or 
that a few or all the people in a given area are accorded membership, provided the 
arrangement is a bona fide cooperative or private service organization and is not a 
device prepared and operated to evade or circumvent the law. 
100 P.2d 571, 573. Additionally, the fact that there is some uncertainty about the potential 
number of shareholders is irrelevant to the immediate proceedings so long as the service is 
limited to shareholders. If, in the future, the Company does begin to serve the general public, or 
those other than shareholders, then we would likely need to reevaluate the Company's 
exemption. In this matter, however, and based on the facts before us, we find that so long as the 
Company is serving only its shareholders, concerns regarding "varying responsibilities for costs 
incurred" among shareholders, and "high degree of uncertainty concerning future development 
and assignment of shares" are not enough to assert jurisdiction. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated above, we vacate our August 11, 2009 order (including the 
order to show cause proceedings) and grant the Company's application for exemption. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of November, 2009. 
Isl Ted Boyer, (Chairman 
Isl Ric Campbell, Commissioner 
Is/ Ron Allen, [Commissioner 
Attest: 
Isl Julie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
